Incentives in Teams

DOI10.2307/1914085zbMath0311.90002WikidataQ56390509 ScholiaQ56390509MaRDI QIDQ4070951

Theodore Groves

Publication date: 1973

Published in: Econometrica (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.2307/1914085

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

91B06: Decision theory

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