Incentives in Teams - MaRDI portal

Cited In (only showing first 100 items - show all)

Strategy-proof approximation mechanisms for an obnoxious facility game on networks
Truthful optimization using mechanisms with verification
Population monotonic and strategy-proof mechanisms respecting welfare lower bounds
Improved Lower Bounds for Non-utilitarian Truthfulness
Combinatorial auctions
Revenue monotonicity in deterministic, dominant-strategy combinatorial auctions
Collusion-Resistant Mechanisms with Verification Yielding Optimal Solutions
Truthful mechanism design for multidimensional scheduling via cycle monotonicity
On truthfulness and approximation for scheduling selfish tasks
Truthful approximation mechanisms for restricted combinatorial auctions
Core-stable rings in second price auctions with common values
Strongly budget balanced auctions for multi-sided markets
A general impossibility theorem and its application to individual rights
Mechanism design and intentions
Groves mechanisms and communication externalities
A control-theoretic view on incentives
An incentive model of duopoly with government coordination
A note on the incompatibility of strategy-proofness and Pareto-optimality in quasi-linear settings with public budgets
Collusion, efficiency, and dominant strategies
Walrasian equilibrium with gross substitutes
Efficient dynamic mechanisms with interdependent valuations
Egalitarian-equivalent Groves mechanisms in the allocation of heterogeneous objects
Strategy-proof and individually rational social choice functions for public good economies
Subgroup additivity in the queueing problem
Fair imposition
Worst-case optimal redistribution of VCG payments in multi-unit auctions
Externalities, communication and the allocation of decision rights
Mechanism design with model specification
Dynamic mechanism design with interdependent valuations
The conservative equal costs rule, the serial cost sharing rule and the pivotal mechanism: asymptotic welfare loss comparisons for the case of an excludable public project
Reporting behavior: a literature review of experimental studies
Group strategyproofness in queueing models
Algorithmic mechanism design
Axiomatic utility theories with the betweenness property
Balanced Bayesian mechanisms
Incentive compatible market design with applications
The positive consequence of strategic manipulation in indivisible good allocation
Algorithm for optimal winner determination in combinatorial auctions
Characterizations of Pareto-efficient, fair, and strategy-proof allocation rules in queueing problems
Coalition strategy-proof mechanisms for provision of excludable public goods.
Truthful germs are contagious: a local-to-global characterization of truthfulness
Manipulation through bribes
House allocation with transfers
Optimal allocation of an indivisible good
On symmetries in multi-dimensional mechanism design
Optimal bidding in auctions from a game theory perspective
On the uniqueness of Groves mechanisms and the payoff equivalence principle
Ex-post implementation and preference aggregation via potentials
Profit-maximizing design of enterprises through incentives
Multi-item Vickrey-Dutch auctions
Coalitional strategy-proofness and fairness
Characterizing the Vickrey combinatorial auction by induction
Algorithms for the coalitional manipulation problem
Mechanism design
Eliciting preferences to assign positions and compensation
Almost all equilibria in dominant strategies are coalition-proof
Second price auctions on general preference domains: two characterizations
Cardinal Bayesian allocation mechanisms without transfers
An options-based solution to the sequential auction problem
A rescheduling and cost allocation mechanism for delayed arrivals
Approximation and collusion in multicast cost sharing
Optimal collusion-resistant mechanisms with verification
Multi-bidding Strategy in Sponsored Keyword Auction
Pricing combinatorial auctions.
Bounding the payment of approximate truthful mechanisms
A Solomonic solution to the problem of assigning a private indivisible good
Constrained-optimal strategy-proof assignment: beyond the Groves mechanisms
Bayesian incentive compatible parametrization of mechanisms
Models for bundle trading in financial markets
Combinatorial auctions with decreasing marginal utilities
Bayesian incentive compatibility via matchings
A general strategy proof fair allocation mechanism
Demand disruption and coordination of the supply chain with a dominant retailer
Simple sequencing problems with interdependent costs
The relation between non-bossiness and monotonicity
Truthful randomized mechanisms for combinatorial auctions
The effect of false-name bids in combinatorial auctions: new fraud in internet auctions.
The transshipment fund mechanism: coordinating the decentralized multilocation transshipment problem
Optimal nonlinear income taxation with a finite population
Threshold strategy-proofness: on manipulability in large voting problems
Computationally-feasible truthful auctions for convex bundles
Allocative efficiency in simulated multiple-unit combinatorial auctions with quantity support
Combinatorial auctions with verification are tractable
Fair and group strategy-proof good allocation with money
Evolutionary dynamics of biological auctions
Resource allocation for homeland defense: dealing with the team effect
Auctions with bidder-determined allowable combinations
Truthful algorithms for scheduling selfish tasks on parallel machines
Pigouvian pricing and stochastic evolutionary implementation
Egalitarian equivalence and strategyproofness in the queueing problem
Strategy-proof and Pareto efficient allocation of indivisible goods: general impossibility domains
On the existence of optimal truth-dominant mechanisms
Strategy-proofness and public good provision using referenda based on unequal cost sharing
Deriving consensus in multiagent systems
Characterizing Vickrey allocation rule by anonymity
Simple strategy-proof approximately Walrasian mechanisms
The strategy structure of some coalition formation games
Computing optimal outcomes under an expressive representation of settings with externalities
Collusive dominant-strategy truthfulness
Roberts' theorem with neutrality: a social welfare ordering approach

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