Incentives in Teams - MaRDI portal

Cited In (only showing first 100 items - show all)

Egalitarian equivalence and strategyproofness in the queueing problem
Strategy-proof and Pareto efficient allocation of indivisible goods: general impossibility domains
On the existence of optimal truth-dominant mechanisms
Strategy-proofness and public good provision using referenda based on unequal cost sharing
Deriving consensus in multiagent systems
Characterizing Vickrey allocation rule by anonymity
Simple strategy-proof approximately Walrasian mechanisms
The strategy structure of some coalition formation games
Computing optimal outcomes under an expressive representation of settings with externalities
Collusive dominant-strategy truthfulness
Roberts' theorem with neutrality: a social welfare ordering approach
Multi-item Vickrey-English-Dutch auctions
Strategy-proofness versus symmetry in economies with an indivisible good and money
Mechanism design for the truthful elicitation of costly probabilistic estimates in distributed information systems
Implementing a public project and distributing its cost
Expressive markets for donating to charities
Sharing the cost of multicast transmissions
Truthful generalized assignments via stable matching
Optimal design for multi-item auctions: a robust optimization approach
A lower bound of \(1+\varphi \) for truthful scheduling mechanisms
Multi-bidding strategy in sponsored search auctions
Asymmetric partnerships
Simplified mechanisms with an application to sponsored-search auctions
Auction-like mechanisms for pricing excludable public goods
Sharing the cost of a public good: an incentive-constrained axiomatic approach
Ascending price Vickrey auctions for general valuations
The pivotal mechanism versus the voluntary contribution mechanism: an experimental comparison
The strategy-proof provision of public goods under congestion and crowding preferences
No-envy, solidarity, and strategy-proofness in the queueing problem
Optimal mechanisms for siting noxious facilities
Core-selecting auctions with incomplete information
(In)efficient public-goods provision through contests
Limitations of VCG-based mechanisms
Combinatorial auctions for electronic business
An equilibrium analysis of a core-selecting package auction with reserve prices
Incentives and the core of an exchange economy: a survey.
Some results of Christos Papadimitriou on internet structure, network routing, and web information
Better redistribution with inefficient allocation in multi-unit auctions
Strategic bidding behaviors in nondecreasing sponsored search auctions
On robustness of forward-looking in sponsored search auction
Incomplete information and multiple machine queueing problems
Secure implementation experiments: Do strategy-proof mechanisms really work?
Mechanism design with multidimensional, continuous types and interdependent valuations
Equilibrium participation in public goods allocations
Optimal-in-expectation redistribution mechanisms
Characterizations of pivotal mechanisms in the queueing problem
Fault tolerant mechanism design
Envy freedom and prior-free mechanism design
On robust constitution design
On social envy-freeness in multi-unit markets
No-envy and egalitarian-equivalence under multi-object-demand for heterogeneous objects
A note on the inefficiency of bidding over the price of a share
Automated design of revenue-maximizing combinatorial auctions
Learning dynamics for mechanism design: an experimental comparison of public goods mechanisms
Characterizations of strategy-proof and fair mechanisms for allocating indivisible goods
Strategyproof mechanism design for facility location games with weighted agents on a line
Modeling profit sharing in combinatorial exchanges by network flows
Forward looking Nash equilibrium for keyword auction
The private value single item bisection auction
Bundling equilibrium in combinatorial auctions
Strategy-proof assignment with fair compensation
A BGP-based mechanism for lowest-cost routing
Analyses of cardinal auctions
Prediction and welfare in ad auctions
Characterization of the Walrasian equilibria of the assignment model
Auction protocols for decentralized scheduling
Spanning tree auctions: a complete characterization
Computing Bayes-Nash Equilibria in Combinatorial Auctions with Verification
Exploring the scope of neurometrically informed mechanism design
Enhancing fundraising with refund bonuses
Does team competition increase pro-social lending? Evidence from online microfinance
Generalized Groves-Ledyard mechanisms
One man, one bid
Welfare lower bounds and strategy-proofness in the queueing problem
Strategy-proof approximation mechanisms for an obnoxious facility game on networks
Truthful optimization using mechanisms with verification
Population monotonic and strategy-proof mechanisms respecting welfare lower bounds
Improved Lower Bounds for Non-utilitarian Truthfulness
Combinatorial auctions
Revenue monotonicity in deterministic, dominant-strategy combinatorial auctions
Collusion-Resistant Mechanisms with Verification Yielding Optimal Solutions
Truthful mechanism design for multidimensional scheduling via cycle monotonicity
On truthfulness and approximation for scheduling selfish tasks
Truthful approximation mechanisms for restricted combinatorial auctions
Core-stable rings in second price auctions with common values
Strongly budget balanced auctions for multi-sided markets
A general impossibility theorem and its application to individual rights
Mechanism design and intentions
Groves mechanisms and communication externalities
A control-theoretic view on incentives
An incentive model of duopoly with government coordination
A note on the incompatibility of strategy-proofness and Pareto-optimality in quasi-linear settings with public budgets
Collusion, efficiency, and dominant strategies
Walrasian equilibrium with gross substitutes
Efficient dynamic mechanisms with interdependent valuations
Egalitarian-equivalent Groves mechanisms in the allocation of heterogeneous objects
Strategy-proof and individually rational social choice functions for public good economies
Subgroup additivity in the queueing problem
Fair imposition
Worst-case optimal redistribution of VCG payments in multi-unit auctions

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