Incentives in Teams - MaRDI portal

Cited In (only showing first 100 items - show all)

Coalitional manipulation in a quasilinear economy
Efficiency and strategy-proofness in object assignment problems with multi-demand preferences
Double auctions with no-loss constrained traders
The anarchy of scheduling without money
Truthful mechanisms for two-range-values variant of unrelated scheduling
Locally robust implementation and its limits
Strategy-proof Pareto-improvement
Strategic manipulations of multi-valued solutions in economies with indivisibilities
Sharing the cost of multicast transmissions in wireless networks
Pay for performance under hierarchical contracting
Mechanism design for policy routing
The VCG Mechanism for Bayesian Scheduling
Frugal Routing on Wireless Ad-Hoc Networks
Mixed bundling auctions
Leveraging possibilistic beliefs in unrestricted combinatorial auctions
Efficiency in partnerships
Relative performance evaluation in organizations with information networks
Profit-sharing and efficient time allocation
Distortion of preferences, income distribution, and the case for a linear income tax
An efficient ascending auction for private valuations
Mechanisms for a spatially distributed market
Cost sharing and strategyproof mechanisms for set cover games
Scheduling with package auctions
Efficient combinatorial allocations: individual rationality versus stability
Comparing multiagent systems research in combinatorial auctions and voting
Mechanism design for set cover games with selfish element agents
Dominant strategy mechanisms with mutually payoff-relevant private information and with public information
Satisfactory mechanisms for environments with consumption lower bounds
Reserve price efficiency and competitive pressure in auctions
Improved lower bounds for non-utilitarian truthfulness
Implementation via mechanisms with transfers
Characterization of ex post equilibrium in the VCG combinatorial auctions
Incentive compatible mechanisms with full transferability
A new characterization of the Groves-Clarke mechanism
Correlated types and Bayesian incentive compatible mechanisms with budget balance
Continuous implementation in economies with incomplete information
The communication complexity of private value single-item auctions
Distributed algorithmic mechanism design for scheduling on unrelated machines
Secure implementation in Shapley-Scarf housing markets
Influence in private-goods allocation
Evolutionary implementation in a public goods game
Is Shapley Cost Sharing Optimal?
Investment incentives in bilateral trading
Market clearing price and equilibria of the progressive second price mechanism
A Dual Approach for Dynamic Pricing in Multidemand Markets
Efficient implementation with interdependent valuations and maxmin agents
Multi-object auctions with package bidding: an experimental comparison of Vickrey and iBEA
Incentive compatibility and informational requirements
Setting lower bounds on truthfulness
Mechanism design with side payments: individual rationality and iterative dominance
Sequential posted price mechanisms with correlated valuations
Mechanism design with general ex-ante investments
A parametrization of the auction design space
Recent studies of agent incentives in internet resource allocation and pricing
Iterative Dutch combinatorial auctions
An optional permit system for global pollution control
Egalitarian equivalence and strategyproofness in the queueing problem
Strategy-proof and Pareto efficient allocation of indivisible goods: general impossibility domains
On the existence of optimal truth-dominant mechanisms
Strategy-proofness and public good provision using referenda based on unequal cost sharing
Deriving consensus in multiagent systems
Characterizing Vickrey allocation rule by anonymity
Simple strategy-proof approximately Walrasian mechanisms
The strategy structure of some coalition formation games
Computing optimal outcomes under an expressive representation of settings with externalities
Collusive dominant-strategy truthfulness
Roberts' theorem with neutrality: a social welfare ordering approach
Multi-item Vickrey-English-Dutch auctions
Strategy-proofness versus symmetry in economies with an indivisible good and money
Mechanism design for the truthful elicitation of costly probabilistic estimates in distributed information systems
Implementing a public project and distributing its cost
Expressive markets for donating to charities
Sharing the cost of multicast transmissions
Truthful generalized assignments via stable matching
Optimal design for multi-item auctions: a robust optimization approach
A lower bound of \(1+\varphi \) for truthful scheduling mechanisms
Multi-bidding strategy in sponsored search auctions
Asymmetric partnerships
Simplified mechanisms with an application to sponsored-search auctions
Auction-like mechanisms for pricing excludable public goods
Sharing the cost of a public good: an incentive-constrained axiomatic approach
Ascending price Vickrey auctions for general valuations
The pivotal mechanism versus the voluntary contribution mechanism: an experimental comparison
The strategy-proof provision of public goods under congestion and crowding preferences
No-envy, solidarity, and strategy-proofness in the queueing problem
Optimal mechanisms for siting noxious facilities
Core-selecting auctions with incomplete information
(In)efficient public-goods provision through contests
Limitations of VCG-based mechanisms
Combinatorial auctions for electronic business
An equilibrium analysis of a core-selecting package auction with reserve prices
Incentives and the core of an exchange economy: a survey.
Some results of Christos Papadimitriou on internet structure, network routing, and web information
Better redistribution with inefficient allocation in multi-unit auctions
Strategic bidding behaviors in nondecreasing sponsored search auctions
On robustness of forward-looking in sponsored search auction
Incomplete information and multiple machine queueing problems
Secure implementation experiments: Do strategy-proof mechanisms really work?
Mechanism design with multidimensional, continuous types and interdependent valuations
Equilibrium participation in public goods allocations

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