Incentives in Teams - MaRDI portal

Cited In (only showing first 100 items - show all)

Coalitional manipulation in a quasilinear economy
Efficiency and strategy-proofness in object assignment problems with multi-demand preferences
Double auctions with no-loss constrained traders
The anarchy of scheduling without money
Truthful mechanisms for two-range-values variant of unrelated scheduling
Locally robust implementation and its limits
Strategy-proof Pareto-improvement
Strategic manipulations of multi-valued solutions in economies with indivisibilities
Sharing the cost of multicast transmissions in wireless networks
Pay for performance under hierarchical contracting
Mechanism design for policy routing
The VCG Mechanism for Bayesian Scheduling
Frugal Routing on Wireless Ad-Hoc Networks
Mixed bundling auctions
Leveraging possibilistic beliefs in unrestricted combinatorial auctions
Efficiency in partnerships
Relative performance evaluation in organizations with information networks
Profit-sharing and efficient time allocation
Distortion of preferences, income distribution, and the case for a linear income tax
An efficient ascending auction for private valuations
Mechanisms for a spatially distributed market
Cost sharing and strategyproof mechanisms for set cover games
Scheduling with package auctions
Efficient combinatorial allocations: individual rationality versus stability
Comparing multiagent systems research in combinatorial auctions and voting
Mechanism design for set cover games with selfish element agents
Dominant strategy mechanisms with mutually payoff-relevant private information and with public information
Satisfactory mechanisms for environments with consumption lower bounds
Reserve price efficiency and competitive pressure in auctions
Improved lower bounds for non-utilitarian truthfulness
Implementation via mechanisms with transfers
Characterization of ex post equilibrium in the VCG combinatorial auctions
Incentive compatible mechanisms with full transferability
A new characterization of the Groves-Clarke mechanism
Correlated types and Bayesian incentive compatible mechanisms with budget balance
Continuous implementation in economies with incomplete information
The communication complexity of private value single-item auctions
Distributed algorithmic mechanism design for scheduling on unrelated machines
Secure implementation in Shapley-Scarf housing markets
Influence in private-goods allocation
Evolutionary implementation in a public goods game
Is Shapley Cost Sharing Optimal?
Investment incentives in bilateral trading
Market clearing price and equilibria of the progressive second price mechanism
A Dual Approach for Dynamic Pricing in Multidemand Markets
Efficient implementation with interdependent valuations and maxmin agents
Multi-object auctions with package bidding: an experimental comparison of Vickrey and iBEA
Incentive compatibility and informational requirements
Setting lower bounds on truthfulness
Mechanism design with side payments: individual rationality and iterative dominance
Sequential posted price mechanisms with correlated valuations
Mechanism design with general ex-ante investments
A parametrization of the auction design space
Recent studies of agent incentives in internet resource allocation and pricing
Iterative Dutch combinatorial auctions
An optional permit system for global pollution control
Strategy-proof approximation mechanisms for an obnoxious facility game on networks
Truthful optimization using mechanisms with verification
Population monotonic and strategy-proof mechanisms respecting welfare lower bounds
Improved Lower Bounds for Non-utilitarian Truthfulness
Combinatorial auctions
Revenue monotonicity in deterministic, dominant-strategy combinatorial auctions
Collusion-Resistant Mechanisms with Verification Yielding Optimal Solutions
Truthful mechanism design for multidimensional scheduling via cycle monotonicity
On truthfulness and approximation for scheduling selfish tasks
Truthful approximation mechanisms for restricted combinatorial auctions
Core-stable rings in second price auctions with common values
Strongly budget balanced auctions for multi-sided markets
A general impossibility theorem and its application to individual rights
Mechanism design and intentions
Groves mechanisms and communication externalities
A control-theoretic view on incentives
An incentive model of duopoly with government coordination
A note on the incompatibility of strategy-proofness and Pareto-optimality in quasi-linear settings with public budgets
Collusion, efficiency, and dominant strategies
Walrasian equilibrium with gross substitutes
Efficient dynamic mechanisms with interdependent valuations
Egalitarian-equivalent Groves mechanisms in the allocation of heterogeneous objects
Strategy-proof and individually rational social choice functions for public good economies
Subgroup additivity in the queueing problem
Fair imposition
Worst-case optimal redistribution of VCG payments in multi-unit auctions
Externalities, communication and the allocation of decision rights
Mechanism design with model specification
Dynamic mechanism design with interdependent valuations
The conservative equal costs rule, the serial cost sharing rule and the pivotal mechanism: asymptotic welfare loss comparisons for the case of an excludable public project
Reporting behavior: a literature review of experimental studies
Group strategyproofness in queueing models
Algorithmic mechanism design
Axiomatic utility theories with the betweenness property
Balanced Bayesian mechanisms
Incentive compatible market design with applications
The positive consequence of strategic manipulation in indivisible good allocation
Algorithm for optimal winner determination in combinatorial auctions
Characterizations of Pareto-efficient, fair, and strategy-proof allocation rules in queueing problems
Coalition strategy-proof mechanisms for provision of excludable public goods.
Truthful germs are contagious: a local-to-global characterization of truthfulness
Manipulation through bribes
House allocation with transfers
Optimal allocation of an indivisible good

This page was built for publication: Incentives in Teams

Report a bug (only for logged in users!)Click here to report a bug for this page (MaRDI item Q4070951)