Incentives in Teams
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Publication:4070951
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(only showing first 100 items - show all)- How to share it out: the value of information in teams
- Pigouvian pricing and stochastic evolutionary implementation
- Strategy-proof approximation mechanisms for an obnoxious facility game on networks
- Truthful optimization using mechanisms with verification
- Population monotonic and strategy-proof mechanisms respecting welfare lower bounds
- Computing Bayes-Nash Equilibria in Combinatorial Auctions with Verification
- Multi-dimensional procurement auction under uncertain and asymmetric information
- Deterministic monotone algorithms for scheduling on related machines
- Arbitrage opportunities across sponsored search markets
- Introduction to the special issue -- Algorithmic game theory -- STOC/FOCS/SODA 2011
- Egalitarian equivalence and strategyproofness in the queueing problem
- Strategy-proof and Pareto efficient allocation of indivisible goods: general impossibility domains
- Similarities in axiomatizations: equal surplus division value and first-price auctions
- Incentive compatible mulit-unit combinatorial auctions: a primal dual approach
- Incentive compatibility and strategy-proofness of mechanisms of organizational behavior control: retrospective, state of the art, and prospects of theoretical research
- A mechanism for package allocation problems with gross substitutes
- On the existence of optimal truth-dominant mechanisms
- Multi-object auction design beyond quasi-linearity: leading examples
- Coalitional manipulation in a quasilinear economy
- Linear-quadratic-Gaussian mean-field controls of social optima
- Connected price dynamics with revealed preferences and Auctioneer's discretion in VCG combinatorial auction
- Properties of bundle valuations in carrier collaboration
- Auction-based distributed efficient economic operations of microgrid systems
- Efficiency and strategy-proofness in object assignment problems with multi-demand preferences
- Double auctions with no-loss constrained traders
- Improved Lower Bounds for Non-utilitarian Truthfulness
- Autocratic mechanisms: a form of dictatorship in constrained combinatorial auctions
- Strategy-proofness and public good provision using referenda based on unequal cost sharing
- Strategyproof auction mechanisms for network procurement
- A characterization of the Vickrey rule in slot allocation problems
- The anarchy of scheduling without money
- Characterizing incentive compatible, Pareto optimal and sufficiently anonymous constrained combinatorial mechanisms -- two players case
- Revenue monotonicity in deterministic, dominant-strategy combinatorial auctions
- Combinatorial auctions
- Optimal and Efficient Auctions for the Gradual Procurement of Strategic Service Provider Agents
- Market pricing for matroid rank valuations
- Implementation in partial equilibrium
- Truthful mechanism design for multidimensional scheduling via cycle monotonicity
- Strategy-proof cost sharing, ability to pay and free provision of an indivisible public good.
- Strategy-proof characterizations of the pivotal mechanisms on restricted domains
- Repeated implementation: a practical characterization
- Characterizing Vickrey allocation rule by anonymity
- Truthful mechanisms for two-range-values variant of unrelated scheduling
- Individually Rational Strategy-Proof Social Choice with Exogenous Indifference Sets
- Collusion-Resistant Mechanisms with Verification Yielding Optimal Solutions
- An axiomatic analysis of the papal conclave
- Locally robust implementation and its limits
- Incentive-compatible cost allocations for inventory games with private information
- Deriving consensus in multiagent systems
- Optimal incentives for teams: a multiscale decision theory approach
- Strategic manipulations of multi-valued solutions in economies with indivisibilities
- Strategy-proof Pareto-improvement
- Implementation theory
- On truthfulness and approximation for scheduling selfish tasks
- Simple strategy-proof approximately Walrasian mechanisms
- Incentive compatible, collaborative production scheduling with simple communication among distributed agents
- Core-stable rings in second price auctions with common values
- The polyhedral geometry of truthful auctions
- The strategy structure of some coalition formation games
- Black-box reductions for cost-sharing mechanism design
- Efficiency and budget balance in general quasi-linear domains
- Truthful approximation mechanisms for restricted combinatorial auctions
- Computing optimal outcomes under an expressive representation of settings with externalities
- Collusive dominant-strategy truthfulness
- Roberts' theorem with neutrality: a social welfare ordering approach
- Simple combinatorial auctions with budget constraints
- Efficient allocation of heterogeneous commodities with balanced transfers
- Strongly budget balanced auctions for multi-sided markets
- The incompatibility of Pareto optimality and dominant-strategy incentive compatibility in sufficiently-anonymous budget-constrained quasilinear settings
- Sharing the cost of multicast transmissions in wireless networks
- Auction design for the efficient allocation of service capacity under congestion
- A general impossibility theorem and its application to individual rights
- Mechanism design and intentions
- Groves mechanisms and communication externalities
- Multi-item Vickrey-English-Dutch auctions
- Mechanism design for the truthful elicitation of costly probabilistic estimates in distributed information systems
- Pay for performance under hierarchical contracting
- Strategy-proofness versus symmetry in economies with an indivisible good and money
- Implementing a public project and distributing its cost
- Proportional individual rationality and the provision of a public good in a large economy
- A self-contained karma economy for the dynamic allocation of common resources
- Coalition-proof full efficient implementation
- Expressive markets for donating to charities
- A control-theoretic view on incentives
- An incentive model of duopoly with government coordination
- Hybrid mechanisms for Vickrey-Clarke-Groves and generalized second-price bids
- A note on the incompatibility of strategy-proofness and Pareto-optimality in quasi-linear settings with public budgets
- On optimal mechanism design for a sequencing problem
- Efficiency and Budget Balance
- Black-box reductions in mechanism design
- Note on the applicability of the VCG mechanism to capacitated assignment problems and extensions
- Competitive equilibria for non-quasilinear bidders in combinatorial auctions
- Computer-aided verification for mechanism design
- Mechanism design for policy routing
- Designing efficient and incentive compatible mechanisms is almost impossible in quasi-linear environments
- The VCG Mechanism for Bayesian Scheduling
- Folk theorems in a class of additively separable games
- Efficient dynamic mechanisms with interdependent valuations
- Collusion, efficiency, and dominant strategies
- Egalitarian-equivalent Groves mechanisms in the allocation of heterogeneous objects
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