The modified Vickrey double auction

DOI10.1006/JETH.2000.2736MaRDI QIDQ1347829zbMATH OpenOpenAlexFDO

Authors Kiho Yoon

Publication date 2001

Published in Journal of Economic Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL https://semanticscholar.org/paper/d715e06a76ea620008016a68b1785b481530c1b4

zbMATH Keywords

dominant strategydouble auctionefficiencymultilateral bargaining

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Noncooperative games (91A10) Auctions, bargaining, bidding and selling, and other market models (91B26)

Recommendations

• Efficiency of Large Double Auctions
• The participatory Vickrey-Clarke-Groves mechanism
• Incentive Efficiency of Double Auctions
• The efficiency of linear equilibria of sealed-bid double auctions
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Cites work

• A characterization of efficient, Bayesian incentive compatible mechanisms
• A dominant strategy double auction
• Bargaining under Incomplete Information
• Bilateral trade with the sealed bid k-double auction: Existence and efficiency
• Convergence to Efficiency in a Simple Market with Incomplete Information
• Efficient mechanisms for bilateral trading
• Equilibria of the sealed-bid mechanism for bargaining with incomplete information
• Incentive Efficiency of Double Auctions
• Incentives in Teams
• Robust trading mechanisms
• The Rate of Convergence to Efficiency in the Buyer's Bid Double Auction as the Market Becomes Large
• Vickrey-Clarke-Groves mechanisms and perfect competition

Cited in

(5)

• Optimality versus practicality in market design: a comparison of two double auctions
• The deficit on each trade in a Vickrey double auction is at least as large as the Walrasian price gap
• The participatory Vickrey-Clarke-Groves mechanism
• A generalized trade reduction mechanism
• On budget balance of the dynamic pivot mechanism

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