The modified Vickrey double auction
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Publication:1347829
DOI10.1006/jeth.2000.2736zbMath0996.91054MaRDI QIDQ1347829
Publication date: 2001
Published in: Journal of Economic Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://semanticscholar.org/paper/d715e06a76ea620008016a68b1785b481530c1b4
91A10: Noncooperative games
91B26: Auctions, bargaining, bidding and selling, and other market models
Related Items
On budget balance of the dynamic pivot mechanism, Optimality versus practicality in market design: a comparison of two double auctions, The participatory Vickrey-Clarke-Groves mechanism
Cites Work
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