Bilateral trade with the sealed bid k-double auction: Existence and efficiency
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Publication:1120444
DOI10.1016/0022-0531(89)90121-XzbMath0672.90014MaRDI QIDQ1120444
Steven R. Williams, Mark Allen Satterthwaite
Publication date: 1989
Published in: Journal of Economic Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)
Microeconomic theory (price theory and economic markets) (91B24) Other game-theoretic models (91A40)
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- Efficient and Durable Decision Rules with Incomplete Information
- Incentive Efficiency of Double Auctions
- Bargaining and Competition Part I: Characterization
- Optimal Auction Design
- Differential Topology
- Games with Incomplete Information Played by ‘Bayesian’ Players, Part III. The Basic Probability Distribution of the Game
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