Equilibria of the sealed-bid mechanism for bargaining with incomplete information
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Publication:1119188
DOI10.1016/0022-0531(89)90120-8zbMath0669.90099MaRDI QIDQ1119188
Roy Radner, Peter B. Linhart, Wolfgang Leininger
Publication date: 1989
Published in: Journal of Economic Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/0022-0531(89)90120-8
Nash equilibria; incomplete information; differentiable strategies; nonzero-sum game; sealed-bid bargaining mechanism
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Cites Work
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- The sealed-bid mechnism: An experimental study
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- Bargaining under Incomplete Information
- Efficient and Durable Decision Rules with Incomplete Information
- A Bargaining Model with Incomplete Information About Time Preferences
- Games with Incomplete Information Played by ‘Bayesian’ Players, Part III. The Basic Probability Distribution of the Game
