Reexamination of the perfectness concept for equilibrium points in extensive games
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Publication:1219784
DOI10.1007/BF01766400zbMath0312.90072OpenAlexW1998191601WikidataQ56658229 ScholiaQ56658229MaRDI QIDQ1219784
Publication date: 1975
Published in: International Journal of Game Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1007/bf01766400
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I: Observable actions ⋮ UNANIMITY IN VOTING FOR VOTERS ⋮ UNANIMITY IN VOTING FOR VOTERS ⋮ The outbreak of cooperation ⋮ Convergence of best-response dynamics in extensive-form games ⋮ A behavioral study of ``noise in coordination games ⋮ The Nash equilibrium: A perspective ⋮ Implicatures of Irrelevant Answers and the Principle of Optimal Completion ⋮ Protecting complex infrastructures against multiple strategic attackers ⋮ Location–price competition with externality: an application to the Tenerife tram ⋮ Equilibria of Games in Networks for Local Tasks ⋮ Taking Mistakes Seriously: Equivalence Notions for Game Scenarios with off Equilibrium Play ⋮ When manufacturers hold information back from strong suppliers ⋮ Unnamed Item ⋮ Approval Voting in Large Electorates ⋮ Time-inconsistent stopping, myopic adjustment and equilibrium stability: with a mean-variance application ⋮ Convergence method, properties and computational complexity for Lyapunov games ⋮ COMPROMISING IN PARTITION FUNCTION FORM GAMES AND COOPERATION IN PERFECT EXTENSIVE FORM GAMES ⋮ REPUTATION BY IMITATION: AN EVOLUTIONARY MODEL WITH STRATEGIC MATCHING ⋮ COMPETITION OR CO‐OPERATION: ON THE EVOLUTIONARY ECONOMICS OF TRUST, EXPLOITATION AND MORAL ATTITUDES ⋮ Logic and Game Theory ⋮ Beyond Normal Form Invariance: First Mover Advantage in Two-Stage Games with or without Predictable Cheap Talk ⋮ Equilibria in Competitive Location Models ⋮ TAKEOVERS OF DIFFUSELY HELD FIRMS: A NONSTANDARD APPROACH ⋮ Time Consistency, Subgame Perfectness, Solution Concepts and Information Patterns in Dynamic Models of Stabilization Policies ⋮ Learning, Words and Actions: Experimental Evidence on Coordination-Improving Information ⋮ USING THE ASPIRATION CORE TO PREDICT COALITION FORMATION ⋮ Good-for-Game QPTL: An Alternating Hodges Semantics
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