Uniqueness and efficiency of Nash equilibrium in a family of randomly generated repeated games.
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Cites work
- Bounded versus unbounded rationality: The tyranny of the weak
- Equilibrium points in n -person games
- Finite automata play the repeated prisoner's dilemma
- scientific article; zbMATH DE number 3777289 (Why is no real title available?)
- Reexamination of the perfectness concept for equilibrium points in extensive games
- Repeated games, finite automata, and complexity
- Subgame perfect equilibrium of repeated games with implementation costs
- The Structure of Nash Equilibrium in Repeated Games with Finite Automata
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