Uniqueness and efficiency of Nash equilibrium in a family of randomly generated repeated games.

DOI10.1016/S0898-1221(02)00109-8zbMATH Open1037.91014OpenAlexW2054148368MaRDI QIDQ1609076FDOQ1609076

Authors: R. Smith 

Publication date: 15 August 2002

Published in: Computers & Mathematics with Applications (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/s0898-1221(02)00109-8

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zbMATH Keywords

Nash equilibriumrepeated gamesautomatanonsymmetric bimatrix gamessymmetric bimatrix games

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Randomized algorithms (68W20) 2-person games (91A05) Multistage and repeated games (91A20)

Cites Work

• Equilibrium points in n -person games
• Reexamination of the perfectness concept for equilibrium points in extensive games
• The Structure of Nash Equilibrium in Repeated Games with Finite Automata
• Title not available (Why is that?)
• Finite automata play the repeated prisoner's dilemma
• Repeated games, finite automata, and complexity
• Bounded versus unbounded rationality: The tyranny of the weak
• Subgame perfect equilibrium of repeated games with implementation costs

Cited In (4)

• Choosing the equilibrium behavior in an infinitely repeated \(2 \times 2\) game for conservative and innovative gamers
• A \(2\times 2\) \(\varepsilon\)-best response stochastic two-step game
• Title not available (Why is that?)
• On voluntariness of Nash equilibrium

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