Repeated games, finite automata, and complexity
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Cites work
- Bounded complexity justifies cooperation in the finitely repeated prisoners' dilemma
- Finite automata play the repeated prisoner's dilemma
- Finite Rationality and Interpersonal Complexity in Repeated Games
- scientific article; zbMATH DE number 3664335 (Why is no real title available?)
- scientific article; zbMATH DE number 3777289 (Why is no real title available?)
- Repeated games, finite automata, and complexity
- The Folk Theorem in Repeated Games with Discounting or with Incomplete Information
- The strength of a little perfection
- The Structure of Nash Equilibrium in Repeated Games with Finite Automata
Cited in
(49)- Codification schemes and finite automata
- Limitations of learning in automata-based systems
- The complexity of computing best-response automata in repeated games
- Finite automata equilibria with discounting
- Repeated games, finite automata, and complexity
- The complexity of computing a best response automaton in repeated games with mixed strategies
- Coalition formation under limited communication
- Informational requirements and strategic complexity in repeated games
- Evolutionary stability in repeated games played by finite automata
- Evolutionary stability in alternating-offers bargaining games
- Evolved perception and behaviour in oligopolies
- Little perfection and complexity
- Bayesian boundedly rational agents play the finitely repeated prisoner's dilemma
- Computability, complexity and economics
- Finite automata play repeated prisoner's dilemma with information processing costs
- Nash equilibrium when players account for the complexity of their forecasts.
- Uniqueness and efficiency of Nash equilibrium in a family of randomly generated repeated games.
- Errors can increase cooperation in finite populations
- Repeated games with finite automata
- Bargaining and markets: Complexity and the competitive outcome
- Simplicity of beliefs and delay tactics in a concession game
- Equilibrium payoffs in repeated two-player zero-sum games of finite automata
- Zero-determinant strategies in infinitely repeated three-player prisoner's dilemma game
- Modeling emotions and reason in agent-based systems
- On the benefits of party competition
- Strategic complexity in repeated extensive games
- A strong anti-folk theorem
- Memory-two strategies forming symmetric mutual reinforcement learning equilibrium in repeated prisoners' dilemma game
- Finitely repeated games with finite automata
- Bounded computational capacity equilibrium
- scientific article; zbMATH DE number 5954365 (Why is no real title available?)
- Bounded rationality, strategy simplification, and equilibrium
- The Structure of Nash Equilibrium in Repeated Games with Finite Automata
- scientific article; zbMATH DE number 1841919 (Why is no real title available?)
- Game theory and strategic complexity
- Uncoupled automata and pure Nash equilibria
- The complexity of recursion theoretic games
- On the Complexity of Coordination
- Bottom-up design of strategic options as finite automata
- Modelling equilibrium play as governed by analogy and limited foresight
- On the complexity of forming mental models
- The effect of noise and average relatedness between players in iterated games
- Machine games: theory and experimental evidence
- Finite automata play a repeated extensive game
- Alternating repeated games via -pre-separation axioms and functions
- Repeated implementation and complexity considerations
- Adaptation and complexity in repeated games
- Complexity and effective prediction
- Perceptron versus automaton in the finitely repeated prisoner's dilemma
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