Repeated games, finite automata, and complexity
DOI10.1016/0899-8256(90)90024-OzbMATH Open0755.90099OpenAlexW2077453922MaRDI QIDQ1193752FDOQ1193752
Rangarajan K. Sundaram, Jeffrey S. Banks
Publication date: 27 September 1992
Published in: Games and Economic Behavior (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/0899-8256(90)90024-o
Recommendations
Learning and adaptive systems in artificial intelligence (68T05) Formal languages and automata (68Q45) Analysis of algorithms and problem complexity (68Q25) 2-person games (91A05) Multistage and repeated games (91A20)
Cites Work
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Cited In (41)
- Simplicity of beliefs and delay tactics in a concession game
- On the complexity of forming mental models
- On the Complexity of Coordination
- Uniqueness and efficiency of Nash equilibrium in a family of randomly generated repeated games.
- Finite automata play repeated prisoner's dilemma with information processing costs
- Bounded computational capacity equilibrium
- Zero-determinant strategies in infinitely repeated three-player prisoner's dilemma game
- Title not available (Why is that?)
- Finite automata play a repeated extensive game
- Title not available (Why is that?)
- The complexity of recursion theoretic games
- Bottom-up design of strategic options as finite automata
- Repeated games with finite automata
- Finite automata equilibria with discounting
- Repeated games, finite automata, and complexity
- Evolutionary stability in repeated games played by finite automata
- Modelling equilibrium play as governed by analogy and limited foresight
- Game Theory and Strategic Complexity
- On the benefits of party competition
- A strong anti-folk theorem
- Modeling emotions and reason in agent-based systems
- Little perfection and complexity
- Bayesian boundedly rational agents play the finitely repeated prisoner's dilemma
- Nash equilibrium when players account for the complexity of their forecasts.
- Evolved perception and behaviour in oligopolies
- Evolutionary stability in alternating-offers bargaining games
- Finitely repeated games with finite automata
- Computability, complexity and economics
- Memory-two strategies forming symmetric mutual reinforcement learning equilibrium in repeated prisoners' dilemma game
- Limitations of learning in automata-based systems
- Bargaining and markets: Complexity and the competitive outcome
- Errors can increase cooperation in finite populations
- Bounded rationality, strategy simplification, and equilibrium
- Coalition formation under limited communication
- Informational requirements and strategic complexity in repeated games
- Adaptation and complexity in repeated games
- Repeated implementation and complexity considerations
- The Structure of Nash Equilibrium in Repeated Games with Finite Automata
- The effect of noise and average relatedness between players in iterated games
- The complexity of computing best-response automata in repeated games
- The complexity of computing a best response automaton in repeated games with mixed strategies
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