Memory-two strategies forming symmetric mutual reinforcement learning equilibrium in repeated prisoners' dilemma game

DOI10.1016/j.amc.2022.127819OpenAlexW4313335951MaRDI QIDQ2698082

Masahiko Ueda

Publication date: 21 April 2023

Published in: Applied Mathematics and Computation (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://arxiv.org/abs/2108.03258

zbMATH Keywords

reinforcement learningmemory-two strategiesrepeated prisoners' dilemma game

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Artificial intelligence (68Txx) Game theory (91Axx) Genetics and population dynamics (92Dxx)

Cites Work

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