From extortion to generosity, evolution in the Iterated Prisoner’s Dilemma

DOI10.1073/pnas.1306246110zbMath1292.91032arXiv1304.7205OpenAlexW2021825464WikidataQ37191805 ScholiaQ37191805MaRDI QIDQ5171023

Alexander J. Stewart, Joshua B. Plotkin

Publication date: 25 July 2014

Published in: Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://arxiv.org/abs/1304.7205

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Cooperative games (91A12) Multistage and repeated games (91A20) Evolutionary games (91A22)

Related Items (33)

Evolutionary behavior of generalized zero-determinant strategies in iterated prisoner's dilemma ⋮ Evolutionary performance of zero-determinant strategies in multiplayer games ⋮ Payoff landscapes and the robustness of selfish optimization in iterated games ⋮ Microbial community decision making models in batch and chemostat cultures ⋮ The evolvability of cooperation under local and non-local mutations ⋮ Evolution of cooperation in a particular case of the infinitely repeated prisoner's dilemma with three strategies ⋮ Game theory and the evolution of cooperation ⋮ Zero-determinant strategies in infinitely repeated three-player prisoner's dilemma game ⋮ Evolution of stinginess and generosity in finite populations ⋮ The robustness of zero-determinant strategies in iterated prisoner's dilemma games ⋮ Value homophily benefits cooperation but motivates employing incorrect social information ⋮ Evolutionary dynamics of zero-determinant strategies in repeated multiplayer games ⋮ Adapting paths against zero-determinant strategies in repeated prisoner's dilemma games ⋮ Reactive means in the iterated Prisoner's dilemma ⋮ Memory-two strategies forming symmetric mutual reinforcement learning equilibrium in repeated prisoners' dilemma game ⋮ Evolution of groupwise cooperation: generosity, paradoxical behavior, and non-linear payoff functions ⋮ Cooperation transition of spatial public goods games ⋮ Non-Archimedean game theory: a numerical approach ⋮ On selection in finite populations ⋮ Zero-determinant strategies in finitely repeated games ⋮ Strategies that enforce linear payoff relationships under observation errors in repeated prisoner's dilemma game ⋮ Combination with anti-tit-for-tat remedies problems of tit-for-tat ⋮ Autocratic strategies for alternating games ⋮ Comprehensive consideration of strategy updating promotes cooperation in the prisoner's dilemma game ⋮ Zero-determinant strategies in repeated asymmetric games ⋮ Partners or rivals? Strategies for the iterated prisoner's dilemma ⋮ Conditions for the existence of zero-determinant strategies under observation errors in repeated games ⋮ Games among relatives revisited ⋮ Evolution of state-dependent strategies in stochastic games ⋮ Optimal administrative response to selfish behaviors in urban public management: the role of zero-determinant strategies ⋮ Controlling conditional expectations by zero-determinant strategies ⋮ Indirect reciprocity with optional games and monitoring of interactions between defectors ⋮ Repeated Sequential Prisoner's Dilemma: The Stackleberg Variant

Cites Work

• The Evolution of Cooperation
• Coordinated Punishment of Defectors Sustains Cooperation and Can Proliferate When Rare
• Equal Pay for All Prisoners
• Evolution of extortion in Iterated Prisoner’s Dilemma games
• The Logic of Animal Conflict

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