Zero-determinant strategies in finitely repeated games

DOI10.1016/j.jtbi.2017.11.002zbMath1394.91033arXiv1707.03097OpenAlexW2735474825WikidataQ47284333 ScholiaQ47284333MaRDI QIDQ1752417

Genki Ichinose, Naoki Masuda

Publication date: 24 May 2018

Published in: Journal of Theoretical Biology (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://arxiv.org/abs/1707.03097

zbMATH Keywords

cooperationdiscount factordirect reciprocityprisoner's dilemma game

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Multistage and repeated games (91A20)

Related Items (8)

Zero-determinant strategies in infinitely repeated three-player prisoner's dilemma game ⋮ Evolutionary dynamics of zero-determinant strategies in repeated multiplayer games ⋮ Adapting paths against zero-determinant strategies in repeated prisoner's dilemma games ⋮ Reactive means in the iterated Prisoner's dilemma ⋮ Strategies that enforce linear payoff relationships under observation errors in repeated prisoner's dilemma game ⋮ Zero-determinant strategies in repeated asymmetric games ⋮ Conditions for the existence of zero-determinant strategies under observation errors in repeated games ⋮ Controlling conditional expectations by zero-determinant strategies

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