Partners or rivals? Strategies for the iterated prisoner's dilemma

DOI10.1016/j.geb.2015.05.005zbMath1318.91029WikidataQ42180484 ScholiaQ42180484MaRDI QIDQ2516229

Karl Sigmund, Arne Traulsen, Christian Hilbe

Publication date: 12 August 2015

Published in: Games and Economic Behavior (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.geb.2015.05.005

zbMATH Keywords

repeated games; cooperation; reciprocity; zero-determinant strategies; extortion

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

91A20: Multistage and repeated games

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