The graph of Prisoners' Dilemma supergame payoffs as a function of the discount factor
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Publication:1194060
DOI10.1016/0899-8256(91)90035-DzbMath0754.90085MaRDI QIDQ1194060
Publication date: 27 September 1992
Published in: Games and Economic Behavior (Search for Journal in Brave)
supergame; infinitely repeated discounted Prisoners' Dilemma; subgame perfect correlated equilibrium
91A20: Multistage and repeated games
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- The Folk Theorem in Repeated Games with Discounting or with Incomplete Information
