The graph of Prisoners' Dilemma supergame payoffs as a function of the discount factor

DOI10.1016/0899-8256(91)90035-DzbMath0754.90085OpenAlexW2015459240MaRDI QIDQ1194060

Dale O. II Stahl

Publication date: 27 September 1992

Published in: Games and Economic Behavior (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/0899-8256(91)90035-d

zbMATH Keywords

supergameinfinitely repeated discounted Prisoners' Dilemmasubgame perfect correlated equilibrium

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Multistage and repeated games (91A20)

Related Items

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Cites Work

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• Equilibrium and perfection in discounted supergames
• Nash and correlated equilibria: Some complexity considerations
• On Repeated Games with Complete Information
• Toward a Theory of Discounted Repeated Games with Imperfect Monitoring
• The Folk Theorem with Imperfect Public Information
• The Folk Theorem in Repeated Games with Discounting or with Incomplete Information