The impact of the termination rule on cooperation in a prisoner's dilemma experiment

DOI10.1007/s00182-012-0341-yzbMath1259.91019OpenAlexW3123265060MaRDI QIDQ444133

Hans-Theo Normann, Brian R. Wallace

Publication date: 13 August 2012

Published in: International Journal of Game Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: http://hdl.handle.net/10419/45614

zbMATH Keywords

repeated gamesexperimental economicsprisoner's dilemmainfinite-horizon games

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Cooperative games (91A12)

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Uses Software

• Z-Tree

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