Finitely repeated prisoners' dilemma experiments without a commonly known end

DOI10.1007/S00182-011-0272-ZzbMath1232.91098OpenAlexW2066052412MaRDI QIDQ662273

Lisa V. Bruttel, Ulrich Kamecke, Güth, Werner

Publication date: 22 February 2012

Published in: International Journal of Game Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1007/s00182-011-0272-z

zbMATH Keywords

UncertaintyExperimentContinuation probabilityPrisoners' dilemma

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Cooperative games (91A12) Experimental studies (91A90)

Related Items (4)

Three steps ahead ⋮ The impact of the termination rule on cooperation in a prisoner's dilemma experiment ⋮ Fairness Norms Can Explain the Emergence of Specific Cooperation Norms in the Battle of the Prisoner's Dilemma ⋮ Revealed reputations in the finitely repeated prisoners' dilemma

Uses Software

• Z-Tree

Cites Work

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• Finitely Repeated Games
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