Finitely repeated prisoners' dilemma experiments without a commonly known end
From MaRDI portal
Publication:662273
DOI10.1007/S00182-011-0272-ZzbMATH Open1232.91098OpenAlexW2066052412MaRDI QIDQ662273FDOQ662273
Authors: Lisa V. Bruttel, Ulrich Kamecke, Werner Güth
Publication date: 22 February 2012
Published in: International Journal of Game Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1007/s00182-011-0272-z
Recommendations
- Cooperation in the finitely repeated prisoner's dilemma
- Finite rationalizability and cooperation in the finitely repeated prisoners' dilemma
- On the iterated prisoner's dilemma in a finite population
- Indefinite terminating points and the iterated prisoner's dilemma
- Common belief of rationality in the finitely repeated prisoners' dilemma
- A note on uncertainty and cooperation in a finitely repeated prisoner's dilemma
- The repeated prisoner's dilemma with imperfect private monitoring
- scientific article; zbMATH DE number 741099
- Cooperation in the infinitely repeated prisoners' dilemma with perturbations
- Unilateral commitment in the finitely repeated prisoners' dilemma
Cites Work
- Recent developments in modeling preferences: Uncertainty and ambiguity
- Finite automata play the repeated prisoner's dilemma
- Finitely Repeated Games
- Two-person bargaining behavior in fixed discounting factors games with infinite horizon
- Title not available (Why is that?)
- Duopoly Strategies Programmed by Experienced Players
- Infinity in the lab. How do people play repeated games?
- The impact of the termination rule on cooperation in a prisoner's dilemma experiment
- When does the game end? Public goods experiments with non-definite and non-commonly known time horizons
- Cooperation in Repeated Games When the Number of Stages is not Commonly Known
- A non-equilibrium analysis of the finitely-repeated prisoner's dilemma
- Title not available (Why is that?)
Cited In (5)
- Three steps ahead
- The impact of the termination rule on cooperation in a prisoner's dilemma experiment
- Cooperation and signaling with uncertain social preferences
- Revealed reputations in the finitely repeated prisoners' dilemma
- Fairness norms can explain the emergence of specific cooperation norms in the battle of the prisoner's dilemma
Uses Software
This page was built for publication: Finitely repeated prisoners' dilemma experiments without a commonly known end
Report a bug (only for logged in users!)Click here to report a bug for this page (MaRDI item Q662273)