Finite automata play the repeated prisoner's dilemma

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Publication:1084866

DOI10.1016/0022-0531(86)90021-9zbMath0606.68050OpenAlexW2131724520MaRDI QIDQ1084866

Ariel Rubinstein

Publication date: 1986

Published in: Journal of Economic Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/0022-0531(86)90021-9




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