Bounded Computational Capacity Equilibrium in Repeated Two-Player Zero-Sum Games

DOI10.1142/S021919891750013XzbMath1415.91039OpenAlexW2618048220MaRDI QIDQ4593826

O. V. Baskov

Publication date: 15 November 2017

Published in: International Game Theory Review (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1142/s021919891750013x

zbMATH Keywords

game theoryzero-sum gamesrepeated gamesfinite automata

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

2-person games (91A05) Formal languages and automata (68Q45) Multistage and repeated games (91A20)

Related Items (1)

Equilibrium payoffs in repeated two-player zero-sum games of finite automata

Cites Work

• Bounded computational capacity equilibrium
• Bounded complexity justifies cooperation in the finitely repeated prisoners' dilemma
• Finite automata play the repeated prisoner's dilemma
• Repeated games with finite automata

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