A simple model of secure public communication

DOI10.1007/s11238-007-9089-4zbMath1168.91325OpenAlexW2149173866MaRDI QIDQ836045

Hannu Vartiainen

Publication date: 31 August 2009

Published in: Theory and Decision (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1007/s11238-007-9089-4

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

(n)-person games, (n>2) (91A06) Signaling and communication in game theory (91A28)

Related Items

Not so cheap talk: costly and discrete communication

Cites Work

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