Games with randomly disturbed payoffs: a new rationale for mixed-strategy equilibrium points
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Publication:2558834
DOI10.1007/BF01737554zbMath0255.90084WikidataQ56504135 ScholiaQ56504135MaRDI QIDQ2558834
Publication date: 1973
Published in: International Journal of Game Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)
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