DUOPOLISTIC HIRING AND SALES COMPETITION—A THEORETICAL AND EXPERIMENTAL ANALYSIS

DOI10.1111/j.1467-999X.2012.04161.xzbMath1261.91024OpenAlexW2122267991MaRDI QIDQ4914343

Siegfried K. Berninghaus, Christian Hoppe, Christian Paul, Güth, Werner

Publication date: 19 April 2013

Published in: Metroeconomica (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1467-999x.2012.04161.x

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Uses Software

• Z-Tree

Cites Work

• Endogenous spillovers and incentives to innovate
• Games with randomly disturbed payoffs: a new rationale for mixed-strategy equilibrium points
• Non-cooperative games
• Fairness and Contract Design

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