Fairness and Contract Design
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Publication:3446416
DOI10.1111/j.1468-0262.2007.00734.xzbMath1201.91101OpenAlexW2140942578MaRDI QIDQ3446416
Alexander Klein, Klaus M. Schmidt, Ernst Fehr
Publication date: 14 June 2007
Published in: Econometrica (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://epub.ub.uni-muenchen.de/13483/1/67.pdf
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