Contractual incompleteness as a signal of trust
From MaRDI portal
Publication:844920
DOI10.1016/j.geb.2009.05.001zbMath1197.91131OpenAlexW3123120057MaRDI QIDQ844920
Publication date: 5 February 2010
Published in: Games and Economic Behavior (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.geb.2009.05.001
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Cites Work
- Contractual incompleteness as a signal of trust
- Signaling Games and Stable Equilibria
- Rationalizability, Learning, and Equilibrium in Games with Strategic Complementarities
- Fairness and Contract Design
- The Principal-Agent Relationship with an Informed Principal, II: Common Values
- Incomplete Contracts: Where do We Stand?
- Intrinsic and Extrinsic Motivation