Intrinsic and Extrinsic Motivation
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Publication:4817916
DOI10.1111/1467-937X.00253zbMath1065.91068OpenAlexW2124203762WikidataQ59567406 ScholiaQ59567406MaRDI QIDQ4817916
Publication date: 21 September 2004
Published in: Review of Economic Studies (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1111/1467-937x.00253
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