Goal setting in the principal-agent model: weak incentives for strong performance
DOI10.1016/J.GEB.2017.12.017zbMATH Open1390.91229OpenAlexW3126055998WikidataQ130076252 ScholiaQ130076252MaRDI QIDQ1753293FDOQ1753293
Authors: Brice Corgnet, Roberto Hernán-González, Joaquin Gómez-Miñambres 
Publication date: 29 May 2018
Published in: Games and Economic Behavior (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.geb.2017.12.017
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Cites Work
- A model of reference-dependent preferences
- Aggregation and Linearity in the Provision of Intertemporal Incentives
- Intrinsic and Extrinsic Motivation
- Efficient contracting and fair play in a simple principal-agent experiment
- Job-market signaling and screening: An experimental comparison
- Does monitoring decrease work effort? The complementarity between agency and crowding-out theories
- Do sellers offer menus of contracts to separate buyer types? An experimental test of adverse selection theory
- Firing threats: incentive effects and impression management
Cited In (8)
- Job challenge as a motivator in a principal-agent setting
- Robustness and approximation for the linear contract design
- Equity-based incentive to coordinate shareholder-manager interests under information asymmetry
- Motivational goal bracketing: an experiment
- When are two portfolios better than one? A prospect theory approach
- Goals and bracketing under mental accounting
- A model of management goal setting and its dissipative structure
- Principal-agent problem under the linear contract
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