Goal setting in the principal-agent model: weak incentives for strong performance

DOI10.1016/J.GEB.2017.12.017MaRDI QIDQ1753293zbMATH OpenOpenAlexWikidataFDO

Authors Brice Corgnet, Roberto Hernán-González, Joaquin Gómez-Miñambres

Publication date 29 May 2018

Published in Games and Economic Behavior (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL https://doi.org/10.1016/j.geb.2017.12.017

zbMATH Keywords

laboratory experimentsprincipal-agent modelsreference-dependent utilitygoal settingincentive theorynon-monetary incentives

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

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Cites work

• A model of reference-dependent preferences
• Aggregation and Linearity in the Provision of Intertemporal Incentives
• Do sellers offer menus of contracts to separate buyer types? An experimental test of adverse selection theory
• Does monitoring decrease work effort? The complementarity between agency and crowding-out theories
• Efficient contracting and fair play in a simple principal-agent experiment
• Firing threats: incentive effects and impression management
• Intrinsic and Extrinsic Motivation
• Job-market signaling and screening: An experimental comparison

Cited in

(8)

• Job challenge as a motivator in a principal-agent setting
• Robustness and approximation for the linear contract design
• Equity-based incentive to coordinate shareholder-manager interests under information asymmetry
• Motivational goal bracketing: an experiment
• When are two portfolios better than one? A prospect theory approach
• A model of management goal setting and its dissipative structure
• Goals and bracketing under mental accounting
• Principal-agent problem under the linear contract

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