Job-market signaling and screening: An experimental comparison

DOI10.1016/J.GEB.2007.10.010MaRDI QIDQ952775zbMATH OpenOpenAlexFDO

Authors Dorothea Kübler, W. Müller, Hans-Theo Normann

Publication date 14 November 2008

Published in Games and Economic Behavior (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL https://repository.royalholloway.ac.uk/items/d1bb5549-9f18-80c9-d28f-27f5b8d4932e/1/

zbMATH Keywords

sortingexperimentsBayesian gamesjob-market screeningjob-market signaling

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Recommendations

• Job market signaling with imperfect competition among employers
• Education signaling with uncertain return
• Signalling to Experts
• Signalling in a Dynamic Labour Market
• Job market signaling and employer learning

Cites work

• Adjustment patterns and equilibrium selection in experimental signaling games
• Advances in prospect theory: cumulative representation of uncertainty
• Belief-based refinements in signalling games
• Comparative statics of a signaling game: An experimental study
• Equilibrium Selection in Signaling Games
• Informational Equilibrium
• Learning and transfer in signaling games
• Multilevel and longitudinal modeling using Stata
• Signaling Games and Stable Equilibria

Cited in

(10)

• Job market signaling with imperfect competition among employers
• Goal setting in the principal-agent model: weak incentives for strong performance
• Voluntary disclosure of private information and unraveling in the market for lemons: an experiment
• ``Buy-it-now or ``sell-it-now auctions: effects of changing bargaining power in sequential trading mechanisms
• Duopolistic hiring and sales competition -- a theoretical and experimental analysis
• Labor market signaling analysis using the probability of misclassification and neural networks
• Referral hiring and wage formation in a market with adverse selection
• Do sellers offer menus of contracts to separate buyer types? An experimental test of adverse selection theory
• Job search with belated information and wage signalling. A comment
• Auctions with external incentives: experimental evidence

Describes a project that uses

Uses Software

• Z-Tree
• Stata

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