Job-market signaling and screening: An experimental comparison
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Cites work
- Adjustment patterns and equilibrium selection in experimental signaling games
- Advances in prospect theory: cumulative representation of uncertainty
- Belief-based refinements in signalling games
- Comparative statics of a signaling game: An experimental study
- Equilibrium Selection in Signaling Games
- Informational Equilibrium
- Learning and transfer in signaling games
- Multilevel and longitudinal modeling using Stata
- Signaling Games and Stable Equilibria
Cited in
(10)- Job market signaling with imperfect competition among employers
- Goal setting in the principal-agent model: weak incentives for strong performance
- Voluntary disclosure of private information and unraveling in the market for lemons: an experiment
- ``Buy-it-now or ``sell-it-now auctions: effects of changing bargaining power in sequential trading mechanisms
- Duopolistic hiring and sales competition -- a theoretical and experimental analysis
- Labor market signaling analysis using the probability of misclassification and neural networks
- Referral hiring and wage formation in a market with adverse selection
- Do sellers offer menus of contracts to separate buyer types? An experimental test of adverse selection theory
- Job search with belated information and wage signalling. A comment
- Auctions with external incentives: experimental evidence
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