Job market signaling with imperfect competition among employers

DOI10.1007/S00182-019-00685-1MaRDI QIDQ2280046zbMATH OpenOpenAlexFDO

Authors Daeyoung Jeong

Publication date 17 December 2019

Published in International Journal of Game Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL https://doi.org/10.1007/s00182-019-00685-1

zbMATH Keywords

horizontal competitionjob marketsignalingwage discrimination

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Signaling and communication in game theory (91A28) Welfare economics (91B15) Microeconomic theory (price theory and economic markets) (91B24) Labor markets (91B39) Special types of economic equilibria (91B52)

Review text

This article considers a signaling model in a job market under the assumption that there exists imperfect competition among employers. The paper begins with an overview of the traditional job market signaling model and its underlying assumptions based on the existing literature, before introducing the proposed model of imperfect competition. A detailed equilibrium analysis is performed on the model and several propositions are presented and proven. The article concludes with an analysis of the interesting results on the welfare analysis and suggestions for extension of the model.

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Cites work

• A model of insurance markets with incomplete information
• Does competitive pricing cause market breakdown under extreme adverse selection?
• Education Signalling with Preemptive Offers
• Game theory
• Informational Equilibrium
• Signaling Games and Stable Equilibria
• Signalling and Renegotiation in Contractual Relationships
• Signalling in a Dynamic Labour Market
• The Theory of Assortative Matching Based on Costly Signals

Cited in

(9)

• Competition in a posted-salary matching market under private information
• Varying the number of signals in matching markets
• Social preferences, sorting, and competition
• Separating equilibrium and persistent inefficiency
• Job market signalling with two dimensions of private information
• Actions and signals
• The marriage game revisited: new insights about domestic labor, divorces and men's expectations about marriage
• Job search with belated information and wage signalling. A comment
• Job-market signaling and screening: An experimental comparison

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