Signalling in a Dynamic Labour Market

DOI10.2307/2297540MaRDI QIDQ3470211zbMATH OpenOpenAlexFDO

Authors Georg Nöldeke, Eric van Damme

Publication date 1990

Published in Review of Economic Studies (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL https://research.tilburguniversity.edu/en/publications/f8bf19e7-ac45-45e3-a8ea-6d91a5021afd

zbMATH Keywords

dynamic competitionincomplete informationjob market signalling modelmultiplicity of sequential equilibrianever weak best response

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Cooperative games (91A12) Multistage and repeated games (91A20) Other game-theoretic models (91A40) Production theory, theory of the firm (91B38) General equilibrium theory (91B50) Economic growth models (91B62)

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Cited in

(31)

• Multidimensional signalling
• A dynamic model of equilibrium selection in signaling markets
• Good signals gone bad: dynamic signalling with switched effort levels
• Bilateral trading and incomplete information: price convergence in a small market
• Dynamic quality signaling with hidden actions
• Experimentation with reputation concerns -- dynamic signalling with changing types
• Equilibria and Pareto optimal of markets with adverse selection
• Job market signaling with imperfect competition among employers
• Dynamic signaling and market breakdown
• Repeated signaling games
• Information about sellers' past behavior in the market for lemons
• Harmful signaling in matching markets
• Persuasion and learning by countersignaling
• Education signalling and uncertainty
• Education signaling with uncertain return
• scientific article; zbMATH DE number 18249 (Why is no real title available?)
• Market signaling with grades
• Job market signaling and employer learning
• Labor market signaling analysis using the probability of misclassification and neural networks
• Education Signalling with Preemptive Offers
• Noisy signaling in discrete time
• Signaling NBER turning points: a sequential approach
• Signaling games
• The signalman against the glut and gap theorists
• Only time will tell: credible dynamic signaling
• Strategic stability in repeated signaling games
• The welfare cost of signaling
• Government interventions in a dynamic market with adverse selection
• Entry under uncertainty: limit and most-favored-customer pricing
• Job search with belated information and wage signalling. A comment
• Job-market signaling and screening: An experimental comparison

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