Education Signalling with Preemptive Offers

DOI10.1111/1467-937X.00115MaRDI QIDQ4939355zbMATH OpenFDO

Authors Jeroen M. Swinkels

Publication date 23 February 2000

Published in Review of Economic Studies (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL https://doi.org/10.1111/1467-937X.00115

zbMATH Keywords

equilibriumSpence's job market signalling modelunproductive education

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Special types of economic equilibria (91B52)

Recommendations

• Education signaling with uncertain return
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Cited in

(20)

• Job market signaling with imperfect competition among employers
• Signaling games
• Market signaling with grades
• Good signals gone bad: dynamic signalling with switched effort levels
• Trading dynamics in decentralized markets with adverse selection
• Signaling and optimal sorting
• Only time will tell: credible dynamic signaling
• Dynamic quality signaling with hidden actions
• Education signaling with uncertain return
• Government interventions in a dynamic market with adverse selection
• Information about sellers' past behavior in the market for lemons
• Experimentation with reputation concerns -- dynamic signalling with changing types
• Dynamic trading with developing adverse selection
• Aggregation and design of information in asset markets with adverse selection
• Dynamic signaling and market breakdown
• Strategic dropouts
• Selling a lemon under demand uncertainty
• Transparency of outside options in bargaining
• Signal-extracting education in an overlapping generations model
• Noisy signaling in discrete time

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