Signaling games
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Cites work
- A dynamic model of equilibrium selection in signaling markets
- A model of expertise
- A model of insurance markets with incomplete information
- A model of pre-game communication
- A Multistage Model of Bargaining
- A Theory of Credibility
- A two-person game of information transmission
- An experimental analysis of Nash refinements in signaling games
- Belief-based refinements in signalling games
- Cheap Talk and Sequential Equilibria in Signaling Games
- Cheap talk in games with incomplete information.
- Communication between rational agents
- Comparative cheap talk
- Coordination and learning with a partial language
- Credulity, lies, and costly talk
- D1 signaling equilibria with multiple signals and a continuum of types
- Education Signalling with Preemptive Offers
- Equilibria with Communication in a Job Market Example
- Equilibrium Selection in Signaling Games
- Evolutionary stability in games of communication
- Fixed-equilibrium rationalizability in signaling games
- Foundations of dynamic monopoly and the Coase conjecture
- Game theory
- Games and information. An introduction to game theory.
- scientific article; zbMATH DE number 47677 (Why is no real title available?)
- scientific article; zbMATH DE number 1226088 (Why is no real title available?)
- scientific article; zbMATH DE number 7088114 (Why is no real title available?)
- Incentive Compatibility in Signaling Games with a Continuum of Types
- Informal communication
- Informational Equilibrium
- Limit Pricing and Entry under Incomplete Information: An Equilibrium Analysis
- Long Cheap Talk
- Meaning and credibility in cheap-talk games
- Modeling language evolution
- Monopoly Agenda Control and Asymmetric Information
- Monotone Comparative Statics
- Multiple Referrals and Multidimensional Cheap Talk
- On the Strategic Stability of Equilibria
- Perfect sequential equilibrium
- Perturbed communication games with honest senders and naive receivers
- Predation, reputation, and entry deterrence
- Professional advice
- Refining cheap-talk equilibria
- Reputation and imperfect information
- Reputation in Bargaining and Durable Goods Monopoly
- Secrecy, two-sided bias and the value of evidence
- Selecting Cheap-Talk Equilibria
- Sequential Bargaining with Incomplete Information
- Signaling future actions and the potential for sacrifice
- Signaling Games and Stable Equilibria
- Signalling among relatives. II: Beyond the tower of Babel
- Signalling in a Dynamic Labour Market
- Strategic communication with lying costs
- Strategic Delay in Bargaining
- Strategic Information Transmission
- Strategic Information Transmission with Verifiable Messages
- Strategic stability and uniqueness in signaling games
- Strict Single Crossing and the Strict Spence-Mirrlees Condition: A Comment on Monotone Comparative Statics
- Strong belief and forward induction reasoning.
- Veto Threats: Rhetoric in a Bargaining Game
- Would I lie to you? On social preferences and lying aversion
Cited in
(12)- Contractual signaling in a market environment
- False modesty: when disclosing good news looks bad
- Repeated signaling games
- Signaling games with endogenous types
- Some dynamics of signaling games
- Signaling Games and Stable Equilibria
- A tree formulation for signaling games
- Signaling private choices
- Non-hierarchical signalling: two-stage financing game
- RATIONALIZATION IN SIGNALING GAMES: THEORY AND APPLICATIONS
- Signaling games in multiple dimensions: geometric properties of equilibrium solutions
- Strategies and equilibrium for two-evader single-pursuer chase games under incomplete information structure
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