Strategic stability and uniqueness in signaling games

DOI10.1016/0022-0531(90)90009-9zbMath0695.90103OpenAlexW2057825256MaRDI QIDQ910349

Publication date: 1990

Published in: Journal of Economic Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/0022-0531(90)90009-9

zbMATH Keywords

uniqueness signaling games strategic stability

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

2-person games (91A05)

Related Items (54)

Inefficient stage Nash is not stable ⋮ Measurement distortion and missing contingencies in optimal contracts ⋮ Bribing and signaling in second price auctions ⋮ Signaling quality through prices in an oligopoly ⋮ Sequential location equilibria under incomplete information ⋮ A dynamic model of equilibrium selection in signaling markets ⋮ IMMEDIATE SETTLEMENT OR ENDURING A STRIKE: THE CHOICE OF SIGNALS ⋮ Not so cheap talk: costly and discrete communication ⋮ Bid signaling in first-price royalty auction ⋮ A never-a-weak-best-response test in infinite signaling games ⋮ Equilibria and Pareto optimal of markets with adverse selection ⋮ The convergence of equilibrium strategies of approximating signaling games ⋮ Signaling Games ⋮ Self-rejecting mechanisms ⋮ Non-reservation price equilibria and consumer search ⋮ Noise-proof equilibria in two-action signaling games ⋮ Market signaling with grades ⋮ Price leadership, spying, and secret price changes: a Stackelberg game with imperfect commitment ⋮ An undominated mechanism for a class of informed principal problems with common values ⋮ Linear Riley equilibria in quadratic signaling games ⋮ Comparisons of standard royalty auctions with seller post-auction effort ⋮ Monotone equilibrium in matching markets with signaling ⋮ Signaling covertly acquired information ⋮ Price signaling with salient-thinking consumers ⋮ Signaling games with endogenous types ⋮ Constrained persuasion with private information ⋮ Job market signaling and employer learning ⋮ Partially informative signaling ⋮ Fixed-equilibrium rationalizability in signaling games ⋮ Bayesian persuasion by a privately informed sender ⋮ False modesty: when disclosing good news looks bad ⋮ Fixed cost messages ⋮ Strategic stability in repeated signaling games ⋮ Experimentation with reputation concerns -- dynamic signalling with changing types ⋮ Evolutionary learning in signalling games ⋮ Credible deviations from signaling equilibria ⋮ Experimental evidence on coverage choices and contract prices in the market for corporate insurance ⋮ Signaling in markets with two-sided adverse selection ⋮ Reserve price signaling in first-price auctions with an uncertain number of bidders ⋮ Signaling through public antitrust enforcement ⋮ Strategic stability of equilibria in multi-sender signaling games ⋮ Perfect bidder collusion through bribe and request ⋮ Technical Note—Signaling Product Quality Through a Trial Period ⋮ CREDIBILITY AND STRATEGIC LEARNING IN NETWORKS ⋮ Persuasion with costly precision ⋮ Discretionary rewards as a feedback mechanism ⋮ Multiscale decision-making: bridging organizational scales in systems with distributed decision-makers ⋮ Comparative statics of a signaling game: An experimental study ⋮ Hypothesis testing equilibrium in signalling games ⋮ Security issue announcement effects when firms use multiple signals ⋮ Monopolistic Signal Provision ⋮ Contractual signaling in a market environment ⋮ The impact of asymmetric information on entry deterrence: An example ⋮ The dynamics of costly signaling

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