Strategic stability and uniqueness in signaling games
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DOI10.1016/0022-0531(90)90009-9zbMATH Open0695.90103OpenAlexW2057825256MaRDI QIDQ910349FDOQ910349
Authors: In-Koo Cho, Joel Sobel 
Publication date: 1990
Published in: Journal of Economic Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/0022-0531(90)90009-9
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Cites Work
- Strategic Information Transmission
- On the Strategic Stability of Equilibria
- Sequential Equilibria
- Perfect sequential equilibrium
- Signaling Games and Stable Equilibria
- Limit Pricing and Entry under Incomplete Information: An Equilibrium Analysis
- On the robustness of equilibrium refinements
- Equilibrium Selection in Signaling Games
- Incentive Compatibility in Signaling Games with a Continuum of Types
- Informational Equilibrium
- Signalling with Many Signals
- Monopoly Agenda Control and Asymmetric Information
Cited In (60)
- Do you want to know a secret? Strategic alliances and competition in product markets
- Signaling covertly acquired information
- Linear Riley equilibria in quadratic signaling games
- Technical note: Signaling product quality through a trial period
- Signaling in markets with two-sided adverse selection
- The epistemic spirit of divinity
- Immediate settlement or enduring a strike: the choice of signals
- Comparisons of standard royalty auctions with seller post-auction effort
- Monotone equilibrium in matching markets with signaling
- Signaling games
- Partially informative signaling
- Market signaling with grades
- Strategic stability in repeated signaling games
- Job market signaling and employer learning
- Contractual signaling in a market environment
- Absorbing Games with a Signalling Structure
- Persuasion with costly precision
- Credibility and strategic learning in networks
- Inefficient stage Nash is not stable
- Noise-proof equilibria in two-action signaling games
- Signaling quality through prices in an oligopoly
- False modesty: when disclosing good news looks bad
- Quadratic Multi-Dimensional Signaling Games and Affine Equilibria
- Reserve price signaling in first-price auctions with an uncertain number of bidders
- Experimentation with reputation concerns -- dynamic signalling with changing types
- Self-rejecting mechanisms
- Evolutionary learning in signalling games
- An abstract two-period game with simultaneous signaling -- existence of separating equilibria
- The convergence of equilibrium strategies of approximating signaling games
- Not so cheap talk: costly and discrete communication
- Strategic stability of equilibria in multi-sender signaling games
- Bayesian persuasion by a privately informed sender
- Equilibria and Pareto optimal of markets with adverse selection
- Credible deviations from signaling equilibria
- Experimental evidence on coverage choices and contract prices in the market for corporate insurance
- Security issue announcement effects when firms use multiple signals
- An undominated mechanism for a class of informed principal problems with common values
- Hypothesis testing equilibrium in signalling games
- Bid signaling in first-price royalty auction
- Title not available (Why is that?)
- Comparative statics of a signaling game: An experimental study
- Perfect bidder collusion through bribe and request
- Monopolistic signal provision
- Discretionary rewards as a feedback mechanism
- Fixed-equilibrium rationalizability in signaling games
- Sequential location equilibria under incomplete information
- Constrained persuasion with private information
- Multiscale decision-making: bridging organizational scales in systems with distributed decision-makers
- Price leadership, spying, and secret price changes: a Stackelberg game with imperfect commitment
- Measurement distortion and missing contingencies in optimal contracts
- Fixed cost messages
- Signaling games with endogenous types
- Non-reservation price equilibria and consumer search
- The dynamics of costly signaling
- A never-a-weak-best-response test in infinite signaling games
- Price signaling with salient-thinking consumers
- The impact of asymmetric information on entry deterrence: An example
- Signaling through public antitrust enforcement
- Bribing and signaling in second price auctions
- A dynamic model of equilibrium selection in signaling markets
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