The convergence of equilibrium strategies of approximating signaling games
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Publication:1920952
DOI10.1007/BF01213909zbMath0852.90134MaRDI QIDQ1920952
Publication date: 6 August 1996
Published in: Economic Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)
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- Effective cheap talk with conflicting interests
- Strategic stability and uniqueness in signaling games
- Multidimensional signalling
- Correlated equilibrium in games with type-dependent strategies
- Cheap talk games may have unique, informative equilibrium outcomes
- Subgame perfect equilibrium in continuous games of perfect information: An elementary approach to existence and approximation by discrete games
- Signaling Games and Stable Equilibria
- Discontinuous Games and Endogenous Sharing Rules
- Distributional Strategies for Games with Incomplete Information
- Existence and Characterization of Perfect Equilibrium in Games of Perfect Information
- Signalling with Many Signals
- Equilibrium Selection in Signaling Games
- Market Equilibrium with Hidden Knowledge and Self-Selection
- Incentive Compatibility in Signaling Games with a Continuum of Types
- Generalized Equilibrium Results for Games with Incomplete Information
- Informational Equilibrium
- Strategic Information Transmission
- Cheap Talk and Sequential Equilibria in Signaling Games
