Incentive Compatibility in Signaling Games with a Continuum of Types

DOI10.2307/1913560zbMath0641.90096OpenAlexW2014508721MaRDI QIDQ3783106

George J. Mailath

Publication date: 1987

Published in: Econometrica (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.2307/1913560

zbMATH Keywords

existencemonotonicity conditionincentive compatibility constraintsinformational economicssingle crossing conditiondifferentiability of strategiesprivately informed agentseparating equilibria in signaling gamesuninformed agents

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Noncooperative games (91A10) Trade models (91B60)

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