Does competitive pricing cause market breakdown under extreme adverse selection?

DOI10.1016/J.JET.2007.08.001MaRDI QIDQ928877zbMATH OpenOpenAlexFDO

Authors George J. Mailath, Georg Nöldeke

Publication date 11 June 2008

Published in Journal of Economic Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL https://economics.sas.upenn.edu/sites/default/files/filevault/working-papers/07-022.pdf

zbMATH Keywords

adverse selectioncompetitive pricingmarket breakdownseparation

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Microeconomic theory (price theory and economic markets) (91B24)

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Cites work

• A necessary and sufficient condition for rationalizability in a quasilinear context
• A Note on Probability Distributions with Increasing Generalized Failure Rates
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• Belief-based refinements in signalling games
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• Continuous Auctions and Insider Trading
• Destructive interference in an imperfectly competitive multi-security market
• Envelope Theorems for Arbitrary Choice Sets
• Equilibria and Pareto optimal of markets with adverse selection
• Fully revealing outcomes in signalling models: An example of nonexistence when the type space is unbounded
• scientific article; zbMATH DE number 45785 (Why is no real title available?)
• scientific article; zbMATH DE number 3256930 (Why is no real title available?)
• Incentive Compatibility in Signaling Games with a Continuum of Types
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• Log-concave probability and its applications
• Logconcavity versus logconvexity: A complete characterization
• On the linearity of regression
• On the projections of isotropic distributions
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• Optimal bunching without optimal control
• Sequential Equilibria
• Signaling Games and Stable Equilibria

Cited in

(3)

• Price signaling and the strategic benefits of price rigidities
• Job market signaling with imperfect competition among employers
• Incentive compatibility and differentiability: new results and classic applications

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