Signaling Games and Stable Equilibria
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(only showing first 100 items - show all)- Moderation of an ideological party
- Equilibrium refinement vs. level-\(k\) analysis: An experimental study of cheap-talk games with private information
- Optimal securities under adverse selection and moral hazard
- Price signaling and the strategic benefits of price rigidities
- Discretionary rewards as a feedback mechanism
- An abstract two-period game with simultaneous signaling -- existence of separating equilibria
- Upper semi-continuity of the separating equilibrium correspondence
- Credible negotiation statements and coherent plans
- Stable equilibria and forward induction
- Fixed-equilibrium rationalizability in signaling games
- Refining cheap-talk equilibria
- Economic implications of imperfect quality certification
- Two-person bargaining behavior in fixed discounting factors games with infinite horizon
- Simultaneous signaling through investment in an \(R{\&{}}D\) game with private information
- Fully revealing outcomes in signalling models: An example of nonexistence when the type space is unbounded
- Competition on many fronts: A Stackelberg signaling equilibrium
- Signaling future actions and the potential for sacrifice
- Introduction: Symposium on evolutionary game theory
- Evolutionary stability with equilibrium entrants
- Evolution and strategic stability: From Maynard Smith to Kohlberg and Mertens
- Forward induction, public randomization, and admissibility
- Social learning in a common interest voting game
- Belief-based refinements in signalling games
- A note on beliefs formation in signalling games
- Measurement distortion and missing contingencies in optimal contracts
- The equilibrium allocation of investment capital in the presence of adverse selection and costly state verification
- A dynamic model of equilibrium selection in signaling markets
- Consistency of assessments in infinite signaling games
- Credible proposals in communication games
- A never-a-weak-best-response test in infinite signaling games
- Generic finiteness of equilibrium outcome distributions for sender-receiver cheap-talk games
- Endogenous Stackelberg equilibria with incomplete information
- Rationality and bounded rationality
- The theory of implementation when the planner is a player
- A survey of experiments on communication via cheap talk
- Credit market imperfections and the separation of ownership from control
- Noise-proof equilibria in two-action signaling games
- Jeffrey Scot Banks (1958--2000)
- A note on forward induction in a model of representative democracy.
- Compaign spending with office-seeking politicians, rational voters, and multiple lobbies
- Inefficient stage Nash is not stable
- An attorney fee as a signal in pretrial negotiation
- Decentralized union-oligopoly bargaining when wages signal strength
- Endogenous market regulation in a signaling model of lobby formation
- Nonprofit organizations, free media and donor's trust
- A model of sovereign debt with private information
- Dynamic bankruptcy procedure with asymmetric information between insiders and outsiders
- Discretionary acquisition of firm-specific human capital under non-verifiable performance
- Non-reservation price equilibria and consumer search
- Risky shifts as multi-sender signaling
- (Sub) optimality and (non) optimal satisficing in risky decision experiments
- The effects of herding and word of mouth in a two-period advertising signaling model
- The signaling value of punishing norm-breakers and rewarding norm-followers
- Licensing and information disclosure under asymmetric information
- Frictional asset reallocation under adverse selection
- Dynamic quality signaling with hidden actions
- Eliciting private information with noise: the case of randomized response
- Rationalizability and epistemic priority orderings
- Adversarial classification using signaling games with an application to phishing detection
- On signalling and screening in markets with asymmetric information
- Equilibrium informativeness in veto games
- Equilibrium selection in sequential games with imperfect information
- Experimentation with reputation concerns -- dynamic signalling with changing types
- Undefeated equilibria of the Shi-Trejos-Wright model under adverse selection
- Strategic dropouts
- Signaling through public antitrust enforcement
- (Neutrally) optimal mechanism under adverse selection: the canonical insurance problem
- Evolutionary stability conditions for signaling games with costly signals
- Implementation with extensive form games: one round of signaling is not enough
- Bidding for the future: Signaling in auctions with an aftermarket
- Credible debate equilibria
- Endogenous timing with incomplete information and with observable delay.
- Contractual signaling in a market environment
- The game of negotiations: Ordering issues and implementing agreements
- Strong belief and forward induction reasoning.
- Bribing and signaling in second price auctions
- Extremism, campaigning and ambiguity
- Dynamic interactive epistemology
- Neighborhood stability in sender-receiver games
- Toward a generalization of signal detection theory to n-person games: The example of two-person safety problem
- D1 signaling equilibria with multiple signals and a continuum of types
- Equilibria and Pareto optimal of markets with adverse selection
- The convergence of equilibrium strategies of approximating signaling games
- On the belief (in-)dependence of sequential equilibria
- Free entry does not imply zero profits
- Asymmetric information and legal investor protection
- Type composition, career concerns, and signaling efforts
- Audited reputation
- Strategic analysis of influence peddling
- Partially informative signaling
- A note on efficient signaling of bargaining power
- False modesty: when disclosing good news looks bad
- Manufacturer encroachment with quality decision under asymmetric demand information
- Signaling valence in primary elections
- Political selection and the optimal concentration of political power
- Limited focus in dynamic games
- The effects of loss aversion on deceptive advertising policies
- Low price signals high capacity
- Player-compatible learning and player-compatible equilibrium
- Extended proper equilibrium
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