Rationalizability and epistemic priority orderings

DOI10.1016/j.geb.2018.12.004zbMath1419.91126arXiv1707.08739OpenAlexW2963552638WikidataQ128644133 ScholiaQ128644133MaRDI QIDQ1735799

Emiliano Catonini

Publication date: 29 March 2019

Published in: Games and Economic Behavior (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://arxiv.org/abs/1707.08739

zbMATH Keywords

strategic stabilitystrong rationalizabilityforward inductionstrong beliefstrong-\(\Delta\)-rationalizability

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Dynamic games (91A25) Rationality and learning in game theory (91A26)

Related Items (3)

On non-monotonic strategic reasoning ⋮ Order independence for rationalizability ⋮ Interactive epistemology in simple dynamic games with a continuum of strategies

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