Intrinsic correlation in games

DOI10.1016/j.jet.2007.09.012zbMath1151.91016OpenAlexW2000361341MaRDI QIDQ938054

Adam Brandenburger, Amanda Friedenberg

Publication date: 18 August 2008

Published in: Journal of Economic Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jet.2007.09.012

zbMATH Keywords

correlationcorrelated equilibriumconditional independencerationalizabilityepistemic game theoryintrinsic correlation

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Noncooperative games (91A10)

Related Items (16)

On redundant types and Bayesian formulation of incomplete information ⋮ OBLIGATION, FREE CHOICE, AND THE LOGIC OF WEAKEST PERMISSIONS ⋮ Correlated equilibrium and higher order beliefs about play ⋮ Rationalizability in continuous games ⋮ Correlation and common priors in games with incomplete information ⋮ On the relationship between hierarchy and type morphisms ⋮ Unnamed Item ⋮ Rationalizability and epistemic priority orderings ⋮ A one-person doxastic characterization of Nash strategies ⋮ Correlated-belief equilibrium ⋮ Preference-based belief operators ⋮ The relationship between quantum and classical correlation in games ⋮ Belief-free rationalizability and informational robustness ⋮ Iterated dominance revisited ⋮ The role of monotonicity in the epistemic analysis of strategic games ⋮ Toward a theory of play: a logical perspective on games and interaction

Cites Work

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