Iterated dominance revisited
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Publication:2059064
DOI10.1007/s00199-020-01275-zzbMath1479.91054OpenAlexW3082024010MaRDI QIDQ2059064
Amanda Friedenberg, H. Jerome Keisler
Publication date: 13 December 2021
Published in: Economic Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1007/s00199-020-01275-z
rationalizabilityepistemic game theoryiterated dominancetype structuresrationality and common belief of rationality
Related Items
Weak belief and permissibility, The existence of universal qualitative belief spaces, Cautious belief and iterated admissibility, Complete Conditional Type Structures (Extended Abstract), Optimism and pessimism in strategic interactions under ignorance
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