An impossibility theorem on beliefs in games

DOI10.1007/S11225-006-9011-ZzbMath1114.03013OpenAlexW2106038630MaRDI QIDQ863184

H. Jerome Keisler, Adam Brandenburger

Publication date: 25 January 2007

Published in: Studia Logica (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1007/s11225-006-9011-z

zbMATH Keywords

modal logicfirst-order logicgamebelief modelcomplete belief modelparadox of self-reference

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Philosophical and critical aspects of logic and foundations (03A05) Logics of knowledge and belief (including belief change) (03B42) Rationality and learning in game theory (91A26)

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