The power of paradox: some recent developments in interactive epistemology
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- scientific article; zbMATH DE number 3078991 (Why is no real title available?)
- scientific article; zbMATH DE number 3078992 (Why is no real title available?)
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Cited in
(35)- Iterated elimination procedures
- The intrinsic quantum nature of Nash equilibrium mixtures
- On the use (and abuse) of logic in game theory
- Epistemic equivalence of extended belief hierarchies
- Conditioning and interpretation shifts
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- From the logical point of view: the chain store paradox revisited
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- A minimal logic for interactive epistemology
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