On the centipede game
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Publication:1268637
DOI10.1006/GAME.1997.0605zbMATH Open0911.90354OpenAlexW2020528916MaRDI QIDQ1268637FDOQ1268637
Authors: Robert J. Aumann
Publication date: 5 May 1999
Published in: Games and Economic Behavior (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://semanticscholar.org/paper/b335f97896efc4ece2d5fa01c2281ecdb9464441
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- Delay to deal: bargaining with indivisibility and round-dependent transfer
- The soritical centipede
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- Exploring the constraints on artificial general intelligence: a game-theoretic model of human vs machine interaction
- The power of paradox: some recent developments in interactive epistemology
- Behavior and deliberation in perfect-information games: Nash equilibrium and backward induction
- Strategy constrained by cognitive limits, and the rationality of belief-revision policies
- Dominance rationality: a unified approach
- THE CENTIPEDE OF ROSENTHAL
- Degrading network capacity may improve performance: private versus public monitoring in the Braess paradox
- Modelling equilibrium play as governed by analogy and limited foresight
- Self-admissible sets
- On the epistemic foundation for backward induction
- Subjective reasoning -- dynamic games
- Competitive centipede games: zero-end payoffs and payoff inequality deter reciprocal cooperation
- A doxastic behavioral characterization of generalized backward induction
- From Common Knowledge of Rationality to Backward Induction
- Uncertain information structures and backward induction
- Equilibria in a dynamic model of coordination of two firms with nonfixed prices
- Joint search with self-interested agents and the failure of cooperation enhancers
- Non-equilibrium play in centipede games
- Non-Bayesian correlated equilibrium as an expression of non-Bayesian rationality
- Rational play in extensive-form games
- Equilibrium play and adaptive learning in a three-person centipede game.
- On the centipede game with a social norm
- Common belief of rationality in games of perfect information
- Common knowledge and limit knowledge
- Title not available (Why is that?)
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