On the dispensable role of time in games of perfect information

DOI10.1007/S00182-015-0510-XMaRDI QIDQ267101zbMATHOpenAlexFDO

Authors Dov Samet

Publication date 8 April 2016

Published in International Journal of Game Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL https://doi.org/10.1007/s00182-015-0510-x

zbMATH Keywords

rationalitycommon knowledgeperfect information

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Noncooperative games (91A10) Rationality and learning in game theory (91A26)

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Cites work

• scientific article; zbMATH DE number 3106184 (Why is no real title available?)
• Backward induction and common knowledge of rationality
• Correlated Equilibrium as an Expression of Bayesian Rationality
• Non-Bayesian correlated equilibrium as an expression of non-Bayesian rationality
• On the Strategic Stability of Equilibria
• On the centipede game
• On the strategic equivalence of extensive form games

Cited in

(2)

• A COMPLEMENTARY NOTE ON THE ISSUE OF TIME INCONSISTENCY REVISITED AS AN EXTENDED GAME
• Timeability of extensive-form games

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