On the strategic equivalence of extensive form games

DOI10.1006/jeth.1994.1001zbMath0799.90130OpenAlexW1979084569MaRDI QIDQ1321537

Susan Elmes, Philip J. Reny

Publication date: 17 November 1994

Published in: Journal of Economic Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1006/jeth.1994.1001

zbMATH Keywords

elementary transformationsperfect recallfinite extensive form game

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

2-person games (91A05)

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On the dispensable role of time in games of perfect information ⋮ Behavioral equivalence of extensive game structures ⋮ The power of paradox: some recent developments in interactive epistemology ⋮ Observability, dominance, and induction in learning models ⋮ Forward induction equilibrium ⋮ Large extensive form games ⋮ Belief change, rationality, and strategic reasoning in sequential games ⋮ Belief in the opponents' future rationality ⋮ Unnamed Item ⋮ Weak isomorphism of extensive games. ⋮ An overview of lexicographic choice under uncertainty ⋮ On the equivalence between (quasi-)perfect and sequential equilibria ⋮ Set-theoretic equivalence of extensive-form games ⋮ Self-admissible sets ⋮ Super weak isomorphism of extensive games ⋮ Thompson transformations for IF-logic ⋮ Taking Mistakes Seriously: Equivalence Notions for Game Scenarios with off Equilibrium Play ⋮ A new game equivalence, its logic and algebra ⋮ Logic and Game Theory ⋮ Backward induction versus forward induction reasoning

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