Backward induction versus forward induction reasoning

DOI10.3390/G1030168MaRDI QIDQ2344936zbMATH OpenOpenAlexFDO

Authors Andres Perea

Publication date 19 May 2015

Published in Games (Search for Journal in Brave)

Copyright license Creative Commons Attribution 4.0 International

Full work available at URL https://doi.org/10.3390/g1030168

zbMATH Keywords

algorithmsbackward inductionepistemic game theoryforward induction

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Dynamic games (91A25) Rationality and learning in game theory (91A26)

Review text

Summary: We want to shed some light on what we mean by backward induction and forward induction reasoning in dynamic games. To that purpose, we take the concepts of common belief in future rationality [the author, Games Econ. Behav. 83, 231--254 (2014; Zbl 1284.91056)] and extensive form rationalizability [\textit{D. G. Pearce}, Econometrica 52, 1029--1050 (1984; Zbl 0552.90097); \textit{P. Battigalli}, J. Econ. Theory 74, No. 1, 40--61 (1997; Zbl 0887.90185); \textit{P. Battigalli} and \textit{M. Siniscalchi}, ibid. 106, No. 2, 356--391 (2002; Zbl 1038.91013)] as possible representatives for backward induction and forward induction reasoning. We compare both concepts on a conceptual, epistemic and an algorithm level, thereby highlighting some of the crucial differences between backward and forward induction reasoning in dynamic games.

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Cited in

(15)

• Backward induction is not robust: The parity problem and the uncertainty problem
• An evolutionary analysis of backward and forward induction
• On the epistemic foundation for backward induction
• Strategic reasoning: building cognitive models from logical formulas
• A doxastic behavioral characterization of generalized backward induction
• Belief in the opponents' future rationality
• A note on Bagwell's paradox and forward induction in three classic games
• Inductive Inference and Reverse Mathematics
• Forward induction reasoning revisited
• scientific article; zbMATH DE number 5734945 (Why is no real title available?)
• On Forward Induction
• Do players reason by forward induction in dynamic perfect information games?
• Logical player types for a theory of play
• The Consistent Preferences Approach to Deductive Reasoning in Games
• Rational play in extensive-form games

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