Forward induction reasoning revisited
From MaRDI portal
Recommendations
Cited in
(40)- An evolutionary analysis of backward and forward induction
- Why forward induction leads to the backward induction outcome: a new proof for Battigalli's theorem
- Rationalizability and epistemic priority orderings
- Perfect forward induction
- Strong belief and forward induction reasoning.
- On the epistemic foundation for backward induction
- Limited focus in dynamic games
- Epistemic equivalence of extended belief hierarchies
- Games in context: equilibrium under ambiguity for belief functions
- Beliefs, plans, and perceived intentions in dynamic games
- Iterated dominance revisited
- Discovery and equilibrium in games with unawareness
- Strong forward induction
- Tenable threats when Nash equilibrium is the norm
- An epistemic approach to explaining cooperation in the finitely repeated Prisoner's dilemma
- Strategic reasoning in persuasion games: an experiment
- Weak belief and permissibility
- On non-monotonic strategic reasoning
- Interactive epistemology in simple dynamic games with a continuum of strategies
- Backward induction versus forward induction reasoning
- Forward induction reasoning and correct beliefs
- Uncertain information structures and backward induction
- Transparent restrictions on beliefs and forward-induction reasoning in games with asymmetric information
- Inductive Inference and Reverse Mathematics
- Rationalizability and epistemic priority orderings
- scientific article; zbMATH DE number 5734945 (Why is no real title available?)
- On Forward Induction
- Forward induction equilibrium
- Inverse subsumption for complete explanatory induction
- Self-enforcing Agreements and Forward Induction Reasoning
- A Priori Advantages of Meta-Induction and the No Free Lunch Theorem: A Contradiction?
- The context of the game
- Robust virtual implementation under common strong belief in rationality
- Stable matching under forward‐induction reasoning
- Directed lexicographic rationalizability
- Cautious belief and iterated admissibility
- Belief change, rationality, and strategic reasoning in sequential games
- Level-k thinking in the extensive form
- Monotonicity and robust implementation under forward-induction reasoning
- The logic of backward induction
This page was built for publication: Forward induction reasoning revisited
Report a bug (only for logged in users!)Click here to report a bug for this page (MaRDI item Q3119038)
