Perfect forward induction
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Cites work
- A relation between perfect equilibria in extensive form games and proper equilibria in normal form games
- Admissibility in Games
- Approximating common knowledge with common beliefs
- Belief in the opponents' future rationality
- Conditional dominance, rationalizability, and game forms
- Multistage Games with Communication
- On a new axiomatic theory of probability
- On rationalizability in extensive games
- Rational behavior with payoff uncertainty
- Rationalizable Strategic Behavior
- Rationalizable Strategic Behavior and the Problem of Perfection
- Reexamination of the perfectness concept for equilibrium points in extensive games
- Sequential and quasi-perfect rationalizability in extensive games
- Strong belief and forward induction reasoning.
- Weak dominance and approximate common knowledge
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