Admissibility in Games
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Publication:5456469
DOI10.1111/j.1468-0262.2008.00835.xzbMath1133.91330OpenAlexW2158026954MaRDI QIDQ5456469
Amanda Friedenberg, H. Jerome Keisler, Adam Brandenburger
Publication date: 8 April 2008
Published in: Econometrica (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1468-0262.2008.00835.x
completenessrationalityadmissibilityepistemic game theoryassumptioniterated weak dominanceself-admissible sets
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