Coordination via delay: theory and experiment

DOI10.1016/j.geb.2022.11.001OpenAlexW4309022354MaRDI QIDQ2681499

Ye Jin, Zhen Zhou, Adam Brandenburger

Publication date: 3 February 2023

Published in: Games and Economic Behavior (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.geb.2022.11.001

zbMATH Keywords

coordinationiterated weak dominanceforward induction

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Cooperative games (91A12)

Uses Software

• oTree

Cites Work

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