Signaling future actions and the potential for sacrifice
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Publication:1196656
DOI10.1016/S0022-0531(05)80039-0zbMath0764.90090OpenAlexW1978241909MaRDI QIDQ1196656
Eddie Dekel, Elchanan Ben-Porath
Publication date: 16 January 1993
Published in: Journal of Economic Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/s0022-0531(05)80039-0
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Cites Work
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- A Refinement of Sequential Equilibrium
- On the Strategic Stability of Equilibria
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