Endogenous incentive contracts and efficient coordination

DOI10.1016/J.GEB.2018.07.008zbMATH Open1419.91180OpenAlexW2887279674WikidataQ129404641 ScholiaQ129404641MaRDI QIDQ1756331FDOQ1756331

Shi Qi, David J. Cooper, Christos A. Ioannou

Publication date: 14 January 2019

Published in: Games and Economic Behavior (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://ueaeprints.uea.ac.uk/id/eprint/68069/4/Accepted_manuscript.pdf

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zbMATH Keywords

experimentselectioncoordinationincentive contracts

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Auctions, bargaining, bidding and selling, and other market models (91B26) Production theory, theory of the firm (91B38) Experimental studies (91A90)

Cites Work

• The effects of costless pre-play communication: experimental evidence from games with Pareto-ranked equilibria
• Signaling future actions and the potential for sacrifice
• Strategic Uncertainty, Equilibrium Selection, and Coordination Failure in Average Opinion Games
• Asset markets as an equilibrium selection mechanism: Coordination failure, game form auctions, and tacit communication
• The effect of intergroup competition on group coordination: An experimental study
• Communication and efficiency in competitive coordination games
• Words, Deeds, and Lies: Strategic Behaviour in Games with Multiple Signals
• Do actions speak louder than words? An experimental comparison of observation and cheap talk
• Efficient Coordination in Weakest-Link Games
• Solving coordination failure with ``all-or-none group-level incentives
• Endogenous Group Formation via Unproductive Costs

Cited In (9)

• Incentive and supervisory contract between special committees and CEO based on the evolutionary game model
• Endogenous verifiability and optimality in agency
• Vertical integration with endogenous contract leadership: stability and fair profit allocation
• Rewards and punishments: Informal contracting through social preferences
• Coordination and discrimination in contracting with externalities: divide and conquer?
• Contracts with endogenous information
• Stochastic evolutionary game analysis between special committees and CEO: incentive and supervision
• Coordination under loss contracts
• Ex ante contracting with endogenously determined communication plans

Uses Software

• Z-Tree
• ORSEE

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