Endogenous incentive contracts and efficient coordination
DOI10.1016/J.GEB.2018.07.008zbMATH Open1419.91180OpenAlexW2887279674WikidataQ129404641 ScholiaQ129404641MaRDI QIDQ1756331FDOQ1756331
Shi Qi, David J. Cooper, Christos A. Ioannou
Publication date: 14 January 2019
Published in: Games and Economic Behavior (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://ueaeprints.uea.ac.uk/id/eprint/68069/4/Accepted_manuscript.pdf
Recommendations
Auctions, bargaining, bidding and selling, and other market models (91B26) Production theory, theory of the firm (91B38) Experimental studies (91A90)
Cites Work
- The effects of costless pre-play communication: experimental evidence from games with Pareto-ranked equilibria
- Signaling future actions and the potential for sacrifice
- Strategic Uncertainty, Equilibrium Selection, and Coordination Failure in Average Opinion Games
- Asset markets as an equilibrium selection mechanism: Coordination failure, game form auctions, and tacit communication
- The effect of intergroup competition on group coordination: An experimental study
- Communication and efficiency in competitive coordination games
- Words, Deeds, and Lies: Strategic Behaviour in Games with Multiple Signals
- Do actions speak louder than words? An experimental comparison of observation and cheap talk
- Efficient Coordination in Weakest-Link Games
- Solving coordination failure with ``all-or-none group-level incentives
- Endogenous Group Formation via Unproductive Costs
Cited In (9)
- Incentive and supervisory contract between special committees and CEO based on the evolutionary game model
- Endogenous verifiability and optimality in agency
- Vertical integration with endogenous contract leadership: stability and fair profit allocation
- Rewards and punishments: Informal contracting through social preferences
- Coordination and discrimination in contracting with externalities: divide and conquer?
- Contracts with endogenous information
- Stochastic evolutionary game analysis between special committees and CEO: incentive and supervision
- Coordination under loss contracts
- Ex ante contracting with endogenously determined communication plans
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