Endogenous incentive contracts and efficient coordination
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Publication:1756331
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Cites work
- Asset markets as an equilibrium selection mechanism: Coordination failure, game form auctions, and tacit communication
- Communication and efficiency in competitive coordination games
- Do actions speak louder than words? An experimental comparison of observation and cheap talk
- Efficient Coordination in Weakest-Link Games
- Endogenous group formation via unproductive costs
- Signaling future actions and the potential for sacrifice
- Solving coordination failure with ``all-or-none group-level incentives
- Strategic Uncertainty, Equilibrium Selection, and Coordination Failure in Average Opinion Games
- The effect of intergroup competition on group coordination: An experimental study
- The effects of costless pre-play communication: experimental evidence from games with Pareto-ranked equilibria
- Words, Deeds, and Lies: Strategic Behaviour in Games with Multiple Signals
Cited in
(9)- Incentive and supervisory contract between special committees and CEO based on the evolutionary game model
- Endogenous verifiability and optimality in agency
- Vertical integration with endogenous contract leadership: stability and fair profit allocation
- Rewards and punishments: Informal contracting through social preferences
- Coordination and discrimination in contracting with externalities: divide and conquer?
- Contracts with endogenous information
- Stochastic evolutionary game analysis between special committees and CEO: incentive and supervision
- Coordination under loss contracts
- Ex ante contracting with endogenously determined communication plans
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