Endogenous incentive contracts and efficient coordination

DOI10.1016/j.geb.2018.07.008zbMath1419.91180OpenAlexW2887279674WikidataQ129404641 ScholiaQ129404641MaRDI QIDQ1756331

Shi Qi, David J. Cooper, Christos A. Ioannou

Publication date: 14 January 2019

Published in: Games and Economic Behavior (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://ueaeprints.uea.ac.uk/id/eprint/68069/4/Accepted_manuscript.pdf

zbMATH Keywords

experimentselectioncoordinationincentive contracts

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Production theory, theory of the firm (91B38) Auctions, bargaining, bidding and selling, and other market models (91B26) Experimental studies (91A90)

Related Items (2)

Incentive and supervisory contract between special committees and CEO based on the evolutionary game model ⋮ Stochastic evolutionary game analysis between special committees and CEO: incentive and supervision

Uses Software

• Z-Tree
• ORSEE

Cites Work

• Communication and efficiency in competitive coordination games
• Do actions speak louder than words? An experimental comparison of observation and cheap talk
• The effects of costless pre-play communication: experimental evidence from games with Pareto-ranked equilibria
• Signaling future actions and the potential for sacrifice
• Asset markets as an equilibrium selection mechanism: Coordination failure, game form auctions, and tacit communication
• The effect of intergroup competition on group coordination: An experimental study
• Solving coordination failure with ``all-or-none group-level incentives
• Strategic Uncertainty, Equilibrium Selection, and Coordination Failure in Average Opinion Games
• Endogenous Group Formation via Unproductive Costs
• Efficient Coordination in Weakest-Link Games
• Words, Deeds, and Lies: Strategic Behaviour in Games with Multiple Signals

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