Strategic Uncertainty, Equilibrium Selection, and Coordination Failure in Average Opinion Games

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Publication:3354548

DOI10.2307/2937932zbMath0729.90541OpenAlexW2014426346MaRDI QIDQ3354548

Richard O. Beil, Raymond C. Battalio, John B. Van Huyck

Publication date: 1991

Published in: The Quarterly Journal of Economics (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.2307/2937932




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