Strategic Uncertainty, Equilibrium Selection, and Coordination Failure in Average Opinion Games

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Publication:3354548


DOI10.2307/2937932zbMath0729.90541MaRDI QIDQ3354548

John B. Van Huyck, Raymond C. Battalio, Richard O. Beil

Publication date: 1991

Published in: The Quarterly Journal of Economics (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.2307/2937932


91A99: Game theory

91B50: General equilibrium theory


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