How tournament incentives affect asset markets: a comparison between winner-take-all tournaments and elimination contests
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Publication:1655547
DOI10.1016/j.jedc.2016.11.006zbMath1401.91057OpenAlexW3125924787MaRDI QIDQ1655547
Daniel Kleinlercher, Martin Holmén, Michael Kirchler, Dawei Fang
Publication date: 9 August 2018
Published in: Journal of Economic Dynamics \& Control (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jedc.2016.11.006
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- Termination Risk, Multiple Managers and Mutual Fund Tournaments
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